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ABSTRACT
This study seeks to demonstrate how the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-05 wrought a profound change in American policy
toward East Asia in general and Japan in particular. Prior
to 1904, leaders in Washington perceived the nations of
Europe to be the primary threat to America's burgeoning
commercial and strategic interests in China. Seizures of
Chinese territory by Germany, France, Britain, and Russia at
the end of the nineteenth century underscored this belief.
Secretary of State John Hay admonished these nations with
his "Open Door" notes of 1899-1900, confident that words
alone could restrain nations whose military power was widely
dispersed over vast territorial realms. The United States
had little else with which to defend its interests in the
region.
Japan's stunning victory over Russia in 1904-05
shattered this complacency, as the formidable armed might of
the island nation achieved virtual dominance of Korea,
Manchuria, and the western Pacific Ocean. Unencumbered by an
expansive empire, Japan could, unlike the imperial nations
of Europe, concentrate its entire armed strength in East
Asia, thereby posing an unprecedented threat to the Open
Door policy.
In the summer of 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt
sought to mediate a timely peace settlement between the
belligerents, fearing that prolongation of hostilities would
result in complete Japanese domination of East Asia. He
envisioned a postwar balance of power in which Russia and
Japan would preserve the Open Door in China by mutually
checking each other's expansionist tendencies. At the same
time, Roosevelt recognized that Hay's precepts required
modification to acknowledge Japan's territorial ambitions in
Korea and southern Manchuria. The tenuous peace that was
framed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire that August represented
an attempt to reconcile American and Japanese objectives in
East Asia.
___________________
Japan's military prowess also alarmed American leaders,
who were only too aware of the virtual defenselessness of
America's recent insular acquisitions in the Pacific Ocean,
and of the decrepit state of American armed forces. With
mixed results, Washington implored its citizens to recognize
the necessity of abandoning their ingrained sense of
isolation from international events and of effecting drastic
improvements in American armed strength.
v

INTRODUCTION:

MOMENTARY OPTIMISM:

JOHN HAY CONFRONTS THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE

IN CHINA, 1899-1900

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 signalled a new era
in the relationship between Japan and the United States.
Japan's remarkable victory in that war, the first successful
Asian counterstrike against Western penetration, established
Japan as the dominant power in East Asia and the western
Pacific region. Previously, the latter decades of the
nineteenth century had witnessed the simultaneous emergence
of Japan and the United States as major industrial powers,
and also the beginning of their determined participation in
the international contest for political and economic
influence in East Asia. Until 1904, however, American
leaders assumed that their chief adversaries in this
competition were the nations of Europe. The small Asian
island nation, though emerging from its centuries-old cocoon
of feudal isolation, largely escaped Washington's attention.
Events occurring at the end of the nineteenth century
encouraged this perception. In 1894-95, Japan waged a
stunning war against China, only to dilute its terms of
peace at the concerted insistence of Russia, France, and
Germany.

Merely two years later, expansionist Europeans,

-emboldened -by-the- Sino-Japanese W a r 's demonstration of
Chinese weakness, embarked upon a new series of territorial
aggrandizements against the dying Qing Dynasty. In 1897,
Russia occupied the Liaodong Peninsula and its harbor at
Port Arthur.1

The following year, Germany seized the ports

of Qingdao and Jiaozhou on the Shandong Peninsula, thereby
rendering the approach by sea to the Chinese capital of
Beijing dominated by European forces.2
Also in 1898, American forces easily ended more than
three centuries of Spanish rule in Guam and the Philippine
archipelago, replacing it with American governance.3

Having

thus gained the final insular "stepping stones" to the Asian
continent by 1899, American leaders believed themselves able
to dictate the terms of international activity in China.
Although the United States lacked sufficient strength in
East Asia to enforce its will there, Washington noted that
its European rivals similarly wielded little power in that
region, since their armed forces were dispersed in the
defense of far-flung empires throughout the world. The
ambitious "Open Door" Notes of 1899 and 1900, and also the
participation of American forces in the international
suppression of China's nationalistic "Boxer Rebellion" in
1900, reflected American determination to prevent the
European political and commercial domination of China.
Russian occupation of Manchuria in the aftermath of the
Boxer Rebellion symbolized this continual European threat
for the leaders in Washington.4
The war between Japan and Russia shattered this
American fixation upon European schemes in East Asia.
Although, prior to 1904, many Americans had predicted that
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Russia, then the largest military power in the world, would
crush the upstart Japanese in an armed confrontation, the
initial Japanese triumphs at sea and on land in February of
that year elicited the nearly universal, if surprised,
approval of American leaders. President Theodore Roosevelt,
long an admirer of Japan, particularly applauded the opening
Japanese successes, perceiving them as serving the purpose
of the "Open Door" policy. Impressed, he quickly sent
journalists and American military personnel to observe and
report the operations of the Japanese armies as they
subsequently advanced through Korea and Manchuria. The
leaders in Tokyo, perceiving the United States as a
potential arbiter between Japan and Russia, reciprocated by
sending to Washington a special envoy whose mission was to
gain American support for their cause. Initially, Japan's
"diplomatic offensive" easily won converts among prominent
Americans who were repelled by the repressive and
incompetent Russian government in St. Petersburg, and
attracted by the progressive image which Meiji Japan
projectedT Ironically, however, Japan's military success
against Russia eventually undermined the rapport between
Japan and the United States. American observers' accounts of
fanatically patriotic Japanese soldiers and sailors
achieving an almost unbroken series of spectacular victories
produced grave apprehensions in Washington through the
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succeeding months. Although elated by Japan's rapid
elimination of Russian preponderance in Manchuria, which
served the American quest for an "Open Door" in China,
American leaders began to fear a potential Japanese threat
to the tenuous position of the United States in East Asia.
Unlike the European nations, Japan could bring its entire
military might to bear in defense of its growing interests
on the Asian continent. Despite the strenuous diplomatic
endeavors of Japan, several influential individuals in the
United States eventually resurrected the specter of a
"Yellow Peril," warning apocalyptically that Japan, drunk
with its victory over Russia, might threaten all other
Western claims in East Asia, including the ill-defended
Philippine archipelago.
Subsequent American policy toward East Asia in general
and Japan in particular reflected this fear. Roosevelt, in
mediating the peace negotiations between Russia and Japan in
the summer of 1905, sought to balance the strength of the
two nations in the contested area, rather than allow Japan
t osu p plant Russiathere completely. Thereafter, he proved
willing to abandon to a significant extent Washington's
commitment to preserving the "Open Door" in China, realizing
that American rhetoric proved no match for Japanese
strength. Postwar American agreements with Japan, though
invoking that ideal, nevertheless acknowledged a Japanese

"sphere of influence" which included Korea and southern
Manchuria. American leaders sought in return for this
concession assurances that Japan would respect the United
States' "sphere of influence" in East Asia and the western
Pacific Ocean. Simultaneously, Roosevelt urged Congress and
American military officials to bolster the defenses of the
nation's insular possessions and to augment its navy with
new and larger vessels. His efforts met with varying degrees
of success. This tacit admission of Japanese primacy in East
Asia characterized America's transpacific relations for the
next four decades.
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CHAPTER I:

THERE CAN BE NONE MORE DANGEROUS IN ALL THE WORLD"

AMERICAN WITNESS TO JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 1904-1905

Japan's decision to plunge into hostilities with Russia
in 1904 resulted from the latter's recent provocative
incursions into the easternmost reaches of the Asian
continent. The leaders in Tokyo had long smoldered with
resentment toward Russia for its complicity in the dilution
of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (which ended the Sino-Japanese
War) in 1895, and for its subsequent seizure of the very
territory which the European coalition had denied Japan.
Moreover, Russian meddling in Korea after Japanese forces
had eliminated Chinese influence there in 1895 continued to
render the peninsula a dangerous threat to Japan's national
security. Lastly, Russia's occupation of Manchuria in 1900
solidified the fears of Japanese leaders who envisioned
eventual Russian domination of the Asian continent.
While preparing to combat the largest military power in
the world through 1903 and the beginning of 1904, however,
Japan's leaders grew aware of their inability to wage a
protracted war against it. Despite glaring inadequacies in
Russian logistics, as exemplified by the existence of only
one isolated railroad connecting distant western Russia with
Manchuria,1

the government in Tokyo realized that, given-

sufficient time, the Russians would be able to amass an
overwhelming concentration of land forces in the eastern
hinterland that would swallow any army that Japan could
deploy. Japan would therefore need to launch its operations

in the winter, when the weather hampered the mobility of the
lone Trans-Siberian Railway, and then strive to win local
superiority quickly.2

Furthermore, prior to commencing

hostilities with Russia, Japanese leaders searched for a
neutral nation that would offer to mediate a peace
settlement once Japanese forces had gained supremacy in the
theater of operations, and before substantial Russian
reinforcements from the west could turn the tide. The United
States seemed the most apt choice for the role of an
impartial arbiter to the men in Tokyo. Britain, an ally of
Japan, could not mediate without provoking Russian protest.
France was an ally of Russia, and was therefore undesirable
to the Japanese. Lastly, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany had
been encouraging his cousin Tsar Nicholas II to pursue his
quixotic dreams of building a Russian Far Eastern Empire, in
order to draw the latter's attention and resources away from
Europe.3
Prerequisite to enlisting the services of the United
States, Japan needed to send a special envoy to Washington
to plead its-case-: The Marquis Ito Hirobumi, Japan's senior
statesman, selected Viscount Kaneko Kentaro, a former
Harvard classmate of President Theodore Roosevelt.4
Receiving his instructions directly from Ito on February 4,
1904, Kaneko initially expressed profound doubts about the
prospects of winning American support, believing that the

United States had strong affinities with Russia. He noted
that, in 1863, during the American Civil War, several
vessels of the Russian navy had sailed into New York harbor,
a gesture which many Americans had misinterpreted as a show
of support for the Union (although, in actuality, the
Russian ships had been searching for a neutral port at a
time in which Britain threatened war with Russia in order to
prevent Russian domination of Poland).5

Moreover, Kaneko

knew of familial and business ties binding wealthy Americans
and Russian aristocrats.6

Disconsolately, he told Ito, "No

matter how eloquently I may speak in America, I could not
possibly draw it away from Russia."7

Nevertheless, with a

desperate determination, Kaneko began his journey across the
Pacific Ocean to the "Land of Darkness" on February 24,
1904.8
Kaneko need not have worried. Any sentimental bonds
that

existed between the United States and Russia had

dissolved by early 1904. Anti-Semitic atrocities in Russia
repelled many in the United States. In April, 1902,
horrified-Americans had learned of the massacre of Jews in
the Bessarabian capital of Kishinev by the local Christian
inhabitants.9

President Roosevelt perceived such barbarity

as symptomatic of a corrupt, incompetent government. In
private letters to Secretary of State John Hay and others,
he dismissed Tsar Nicholas II as "a preposterous little
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creature” and asserted that "no human beings, black, yellow,
or white could be quite as untruthful, as insincere, as
arrogant - in short, as untrustworthy in every way - as the
Russians under the present system."10

For Roosevelt, a

prime example of Russian perfidy was St. Petersburg's
refusal to withdraw its forces from Manchuria, despite
earlier promises to Beijing made in the aftermath of the
Boxer Rebellion to relinquish control of the region to
China. Continued Russian occupation of Manchuria also
jeopardized the "Open Door" policy objectives of the United
States.
To Kaneko's pleasant surprise, Roosevelt and many other
influential Americans applauded the Asian David that was
courageously confronting the European Goliath. In the White
House, Kaneko's former classmate, who had read widely about
Japan, deeply admired the Japanese societal values embodied
in the code of bushido and was profoundly impressed by
Japan's rapid modernization.11

In early February, 1904,

prior to Kaneko's arrival in the United States, Oscar
S t r a u s y a c l o s e friend and advisor of Roosevelt, sent to the
White House a letter which closed by saying, "Japan is
certainly battling on the side of civilization - may wisdom
and victory be on her side."12

Roosevelt himself exulted

that "Japan is playing our game (on behalf of the Open Door
principle)" by challenging the Russian presence in East
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Asia.13

Kaneko found the people outside the nation's

capital equally receptive. Many Americans somewhat naively
attributed to Japanese leaders altruistic motives on behalf
of Chinese nationhood. American business leaders
enthusiastically received articles and speeches from the
Japanese envoy, in which he envisioned future collaboration
between Japan and the United States in furthering
international commerce in East Asia.14

Several prominent

American bankers, angered by the plight of Russian Jews and
by Russia's heavy-handed conduct in Asia, expressed to
Kaneko their interest in extending loans to Tokyo to help
Japan finance its war.15

Some Americans harbored such

hatred toward Russia that they were willing to go even
further on Japan's behalf. Three thousand American Jews
formed a volunteer army to assist the Japanese forces. Other
Americans offered to donate a United States warship to
Japan's navy.16

As the historian Kamikawa Hikomatsu has

noted, "American public opinion was favorable to Japan
partly out of self interest and curiosity, but chiefly out
ofdisinterested moralindignation at Russia."17
Such outpourings of support for Japan continued
undiminished even after Americans learned of Japan's
unorthodox manner of commencing hostilities. On the night of
February 8, 1904, a squadron of Japanese destroyers from the
fleet of Admiral Togo Heihachiro suddenly attacked the
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Russian Far Eastern Fleet stationed at Port Arthur,
inflicting serious damage upon three Russian vessels. This
assault, an attempt to gain naval supremacy in the theater
of operations, preceded Tokyo's formal declaration of war by
two days.18

Earlier that day, the first Japanese ground

forces had landed at Chemulpo (Inchon) on Korea's west
coast. The next day, February 9, another Japanese naval
detachment destroyed the three Russian warships stationed at
Chemulpo. These acts violated Korean neutrality.19

St.

Petersburg angrily accused the 11insolent” Japanese of
“treachery. ,|2°
Although some Americans criticized Japan for its
abandonment of the conventional rules of war, they were in a
distinct minority. In a letter to his son, Theodore, Jr.,
dated February 10, President Roosevelt affirmed that he "was
thoroughly well pleased with the Japanese victory" at Port
Arthur, and remarked that "the supine carelessness (of the
Russians) is well-nigh incredible."21

Five days later,

Elihu Root, who had recently resigned his position as
t— Secretary of War,— sent Roosevelt a letter in which he asked
approvingly, "Was not the way the Japs began the fight
bully?"22

American newspapers echoed this sentiment,

disparaging Russia for its lack of preparation. An editorial
appearing in the New York Times on February 10 praised the
"prompt, enterprising, and gallant feat of the Japanese
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arms" and presciently observed that "the moral effect of
this victory is of course immeasurably greater than its
material consequences.1,23

The next day, the Times scolded

the Russians for charging Japan of wrongdoing:

It seems hardly to become the dignity of the ruler
of a great nation to complain that he has been
struck before he was quite ready...If Russia has
been caught unprepared, the fault is surely her
own. She has been protracting negotiations which
it was quite evident could come to nothing...If
Admiral (Evgeny) Alexeiev (the Russian Viceroy in
the Far East, and the overall commander of all
Russian naval and land forces there) did not have
his preparations made and his searchlights going
when the Japanese torpedo boats attacked him, he
has nobody but himself to blame.24

Similar tactics would elicit a dramatically different
response from the United States when they were later used
against the American Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor
on December 7, 1941.
Washington's first official priority following the
outbreak of the war was the preservation of the neutrality
of the United States and its insular possessions in the_____
Pacific Ocean. Roosevelt proclaimed American neutrality on
February 15, 1904, severely limiting the access of
belligerent vessels to ports owned by the United States.25
Further, pursuant to limiting the geographical scope of
hostilities and to maintaining the "Open Door" policy in

China, American leaders ambitiously sought to uphold the
neutrality of Chinese territory outside of Manchuria. On
February 10, Secretary of State Hay sent a proclamation of
Chinese neutrality to the belligerent capitals, as well as
to Berlin, Paris, and London; all subsequently indicated
agreement.26

Such assertions reflected the continuing

beliefs in Washington that the United States could shape
international behavior in East Asia with words alone, and
that Europe should be the prime recipient of its
admonitions.
The course of hostilities at sea and on land shattered
these assumptions. As the custodian of American interests in
the Pacific and East Asia, the American navy frequently
proved unable to assert its role, especially as Japanese
naval power gained dominance in the northwestern Pacific.
The first indication of this trend was the Japanese naval
assault upon Russian warships in Chemulpo (Inchon) on
February 8-9, 1904. Though the Russians bravely steamed out
of the Korean harbor to face destruction, Korean neutrality
had become the first casualty of the conflict. One week
later, the first division of soldiers that would
comprise the Japanese First Army under the command of
General Kuroki Tametomo landed at the embattled port. On
February 25, Japanese forces in Seoul exacted from the
Korean government a treaty which transformed the peninsula

into a Japanese protectorate.27

Ultimately, Roosevelt

acknowledged Japanese hegemony over Korea, "which has shown
its utter inability to stand by itself."28
Through subsequent months, Japanese naval superiority
in the area of hostilities continued to grow as Togo strove
to trap the Russian Far Eastern Fleet in Port Arthur. The
effects of this accruement of strength eventually
compromised Chinese neutrality, American protests
notwithstanding. The final Japanese naval blow against the
ill-fated Port Arthur Fleet occurred on August 10, 1904, as
the Russian ships made a desperate dash for the freedom of
the northern port of Vladivostok. En route, they encountered
the bulk of Togo's fleet in the Yellow Sea. Though both
navies sustained heavy damage in the ensuing engagement, the
result was another Japanese victory. Their admiral killed,
most of the battered Russian vessels retreated to Port
Arthur, where they remained for the duration of the war; the
other Russian ships fled toward neutral harbors along the
Asian coast.29
------- Therein lay the rub. Most of the Russian warships that
reached ports in China and French Indochina were disarmed
and interned for the remainder of the war without incident.
However, disputes concerning other Russian naval refugees
demonstrated to the United States the difficulties of
enforcing the belligerents' respect of Chinese neutrality.

On August 11, the day after the battle, the Russian cruiser
Ryeshitelni requested internment in the port of Zhefu on the
Shandong Peninsula, where it proceeded to disarm in the
presence of other vessels belonging to various nations,
including the United States. Suddenly, outside the harbor
loomed two Japanese destroyers whose commander demanded the
surrender of the Russian vessel. Ignoring protests from the
American and the other neutral ships, the Japanese ships
entered the harbor and towed the Russian ship away;
subsequently, the ship was incorporated into Togo's fleet.30
The next day, two other Russian warships, the Askold
and the Grosovoi, sought refuge and repairs in Shanghai;
Japan angrily demanded their expulsion from the Chinese
port. Though several American destroyers were stationed in
Shanghai, the American Consul-General there, John Goodnow,
cabled Washington for advice. Unwilling to commit the
American navy to the defense of Chinese neutrality, since it
was now becoming clear that such a policy would prevent the
use of American vessels elsewhere, Roosevelt ordered the
chief American naval officer in the vicinity, Admiral Yates
Stirling, not to interfere in the event of combat between
Russian and Japanese vessels in Chinese ports. The President
and acting Secretary of State Alvee Adee also warned Goodnow
not to uphold the neutrality of Shanghai either alone or in
conjunction with the other neutral envoys there. Though the

crisis was finally resolved on August 24, when the two
Russian vessels agreed to disarmament and internment, the
incident impelled Washington to abandon its earlier advocacy
of Chinese neutrality.31

Roosevelt thereafter contended

that the Chinese ports should relinquish their claims to
neutrality, and become "spheres of hostility to which the
Russians could no longer run if followed."32

Washington

thus began to abdicate its avowed role as the guarantor of
the "Open Door" policy in China, in response to demonstrated
inability to enforce its terms.
Having virtually abandoned the defense of Chinese
neutrality, Washington then endeavored to isolate the
Philippine archipelago through the remaining months of the
war. Although the Russian fleet at Port Arthur was no longer
a subject of concern after August, American leaders learned
in October of 1904 that Russia's Baltic Fleet, under the
command of Admiral Zinovy Rozhdestvenski, had left the port
of Reval (in present-day Estonia) and embarked on the
arduous 18,000-mile voyage to the area of operations. 33

As

Rozhdestvenski's ships crawled eastward, advance Japanese
naval patrols steamed to Singapore, causing American naval
officials to believe that the engagement between the
opposing fleets, should it occur, would take place somewhere
in the southern Pacific. Accordingly, Admiral Stirling was
ordered in January of 1905 to consolidate all of his naval
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forces in the Philippines in order to prevent belligerent
intrusion into the islands' harbors.34
The anticipation ended on May 27, 1905. On that day, in
the greatest naval battle since Trafalgar a century earlier,
Togo crushed Rozhdestvenski's exhausted fleet in the Straits
of Tsushima, which divide Japan from Korea. As the slow
Russian vessels advanced in single file, Togo's fleet
"crossed the T" and inflicted a devastating fire upon them.
All through the following night, Japanese torpedo boats
harried the surviving enemy ships, and, on the morning of
May 28, the few Russian ships still afloat in the area
surrendered. Only three vessels from the Baltic Fleet
successfully reached Vladivostok; other refugees fled for
Shanghai and other neutral ports. The losses sustained by
the two navies attested to the lopsided nature of the
Japanese victory. Rozhdestvenski, seriously wounded in the
fight and captured at its conclusion, lost sixteen of his
twenty-nine battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, including
his flagship, the Suvarov, During the battle and its
aftermath, over 13,500 Russian sailors were either killed,
taken prisoner, or interned in neutral countries. In
striking contrast, Togo's navy had lost only three torpedo
boats; though several other Japanese ships were badly
damaged, they were still operational. Moreover, the Japanese
incurred only 700 casualties during the engagement.35
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Thereafter, the Japanese navy wielded uncontested dominance
of the western Pacific Ocean. A distinguished naval
historian, Roosevelt sent an ebullient note of
congratulation to Kaneko on May 31, asserting that "neither
Trafalgar nor the defeat of the Spanish Armada was as
complete - as overwhelming" as the Japanese triumph.36
The aftermath of Tsushima presented the American navy
with a challenge to the preservation of neutrality in the
Philippines. In early June of 1905, three Russian cruisers
that had survived the battle (the Oleg, the Aurora, and the
Zhemchug) limped into Manila Bay. Upon arrival, the Russian
commander, Admiral Oscar Enquist, pleaded for supplies and
repairs for his stricken ships. Roosevelt himself refused
this request. Instead, he demanded that the Russian vessels
either leave Manila Bay within twenty-four hours or submit
to internment. The drained Russians chose the latter
option.37
Thus, the naval war between Russia and Japan
demonstrated the limits of the American ability to insulate
Chinese ports from the impact of combat in the surrounding
waters, which was an integral aspect of the "Open Door"
policy. Thereafter, Washington was aware that a determined
belligerent wielding local naval superiority in that region
could easily thwart American policy objectives. As
illustrated by the seizure of the Ryeshitelni, vessels of

21

the Japanese navy could range virtually at will in Chinese
harbors, with American and European agents having little
besides words with which to counter them. Moreover, American
naval power could not shield the Philippine archipelago from
the effects of foreign conflict in that vicinity. Three of
the Russian naval vessels that had survived Tsushima
successfully penetrated Manila Bay, despite American efforts
to isolate the islands from belligerent activity. The
convalescence of the Russian cruisers there represented a
substantial retreat from the original parameters which
Roosevelt had delineated in his proclamation of American
neutrality at the outbreak of hostilities. The sudden,
unchallenged predominance of the formidable Japanese navy in
the western Pacific after its destruction of the Baltic
i

,

Fleet further emphasized the tenuousness of the American
position in that region. After his jubilation at the
climactic outcome of the naval war subsided, Roosevelt soon
perceived its implications. Sobered by this realization, he
expressed his concern in a confidential letter to Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge on June 5, 1905:

While we had thought that the probabilities
favored Togo's victory, most of us, and certainly
I, had thought that the fight would be close, that
there was some chance for the Russians, and that
at least there would be a terrible battering of the
Japanese ships. No one anticipated that it would be
a rout and a slaughter rather than a fight; that the
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Russian fleet would be absolutely destroyed while
the Japanese fleet was left practically uninjured.38

For the first time in history, a major naval power had its
entire arsenal concentrated in the western Pacific, thus
posing a new challenge to the comparatively dispersed
Western navies.
Japan's armies proved equally effective in
demonstrating their primacy in East Asia, and the
corresponding frailty of Washington's "Open Door" policy in
China. Roosevelt was already well aware of the prowess of
the Japanese soldier. During the international suppression
of the Boxer Rebellion, he had received letters from
American soldiers in China which suggested that the Japanese
soldiers outclassed their Western comrades; impressed,
Roosevelt had remarked to his German friend Hermann Speck
von Sternburg, "What natural fighters they are!"39

In 1904,

with the inefficiency of the American army in the war with
Spain still a recent memory, the President quickly perceived
the w ar between Japan -and -Russia ~as-an~~opportunity to
witness the methods of the Japanese land forces and learn
from them. For this task, he enlisted the services of
several journalists and officers in the American army.
He encountered little difficulty in finding volunteers.
War correspondents such as Frederick Palmer, J. Martin

Miller, and Richard Harding Davis eagerly embraced the
opportunity to capture the impending drama in words.40

From

among its officers, the United States Army sent such
contemporary and future luminaries as General Arthur
MacArthur and his twenty-four-year-old son Douglas, Captain
Peyton C. March, and Captain John J. Pershing to observe the
Eastern conflagration.41

Though American observers

accompanied the Russian as well as the Japanese armies,
Washington's attention was riveted upon the latter.
Between mid-February and early May of 1904, the world's
attention devolved upon General Kuroki Tametomo's army as it
marched northward along the muddy roads of Korea toward
Manchuria, fending off sporadic attacks by Cossack cavalry
raiders en route.42

Arrayed on the northern bank of the

Yalu River against this advancing column was a smaller
Russian army under the command of Lieutenant-General Mikhail
Zasulich. Although the overall commander of Russian land
forces in Manchuria, General Alexei Kuropatkin, had ordered
Zasulich to withdraw if outnumbered, Zasulich, "scoffing at
Kuropatkin's suggestion that the Japanese were to be
regarded as the equals of European troops," chose to give
battle instead.43

This decision proved to be a foolish

mistake. The two armies clashed on April 25; after several
days of pounding the Russian position on the northern bank
with artillery, the Japanese army emerged victorious on May
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l.44

Although the battle of the Yalu River was a minor

engagement in comparison with the epic struggles that lay
ahead, it had been the proving ground for Japan. Thereafter,
11it was no longer a collection of tiny islands inhabited by
curious little people, but a new and serious factor in
international affairs."45
The significance of this engagement was not lost upon
contemporary Western citizens. Kuroki's victory persuaded
American and British bankers that the Japanese war effort
was a sound investment; for the duration of the conflict,
they willingly extended to Tokyo loans of almost
unprecedented magnitude.46

The New York Times' report of

the battle, which appeared on May 3, offered a prescient
comment on its long-term ramifications:

Although the defeat of a fraction of the Tsar's huge
army is not necessarily decisive, the consequences of
this battle promise to be far-reaching. Rivals and
subject races alike have waited for Russia to make
good her boasts and affirm the predominance to
which she both aspires and pretends. She has given
battle on ground of her own choosing, and has been
badly- beaten by a despised and Oriental army. The
echoes of the battle will reverberate afar, and
distant is the day when the story will weary in
the telling among the races of the unforgiving East.47

Two weeks after the triumph on the Yalu, Captain Peyton
C. March presented his credentials to Kuroki as the Japanese
hero led his forces through Manchuria. Both Palmer and March

accompanied the Japanese First Army on its trek until the
following November.48

March was immediately struck at the

ease with which Japanese spies obtained information about
Russian movements. As he later reported, 11(the Japanese
soldiers') familiarity with the Chinese language; the
readiness with which a Japanese can simulate a Chinese; and
the utter impossibility of the big, blue-eyed, fair Russian
successfully accomplishing such a feat, gives to the
Japanese a great advantage while operating in this
country."49

Reinforcements from western Russia (who were

widely regarded as qualitatively superior to their Siberian
comrades) failed to blunt the Japanese thrust that summer.50
Meanwhile, three more Japanese armies landed in
Manchuria, attracting the attention of other American
observers. Similar to the early experiences of Kuroki's
vanguard, these armies, operating independently, initially
encountered relatively small bodies of Russian soldiers. In
May, the Japanese Second Army, under the command of General
Oku Yasukata, appeared on the Liaodong Peninsula to the
north of Port Arthur, where it trounced a Russian regiment
led by Colonel Nikolai Tretyakov at Nanshan (May 25-26).51
After thus isolating Port Arthur from the main Russian
forces in Manchuria, Oku turned northward, while General
Nogi Maresuke's Third Army prepared to batter the surrounded
harbor into submission.52

Lastly, advancing between the

armies under Kuroki and Oku was the Fourth Army, led by
General Nozu Michitsura.53
Although engagements of limited scale continued to
characterize the land war into the early summer of 1904, the
Japanese campaign gradually obtained a guise of much vaster
proportions as three of the armies converged upon the
Manchurian city of Liaoyang, the administrative center of
Kuropatkin's forces. In order to coordinate the Japanese
plunges into Manchuria, Field-Marshal Oyama Iwao assumed the
task of their overall direction in early July of 1904. He
left Japan with his chief of staff, the brilliant
Lieutenant-General Kodama Gentaro, to join Oku's army on
July 6.54

As the three Japanese armies became welded into a

single unit, several Western observers began to believe that
the impending battle would decide the outcome of the war.
General Sir Ian Hamilton, Britain's military observer with
Kuroki's army, remarked in his wartime diary on August 23,
"What a splendid thing to be alive, and to be taking part in
the great final trek of the Manchurian War!"55__ ________ ____
Though the battle which erupted south of Liaoyang three
days later did not occur at the end of the "final trek" of
Oyama's troops, it was the first full-scale land engagement
of the war. Witnessing this struggle raging along a ten-mile
front, Palmer declared, "The great conflict (has) begun!"
and added, "the havoc of five hundred guns was outlined as

clearly as the battle panorama of a Gettysburg or a
Sedan."56

Outnumbered by the Russians (125,000 Japanese

soldiers against 158,000 Russian troops), the Japanese
compensated for their numerical inferiority with bold
tactics and superior organization. As a result, Oyama
eventually forced Kuropatkin to retreat northward on the
morning of September 4. Nevertheless, the Japanese soldiers,
their supply of ammunition depleted, could not contest the
Russian retreat. Though he had successfully outmaneuvered
Kuropatkin, Oyama nevertheless paid a high price for victory
at Liaoyang. Japanese casualties greatly outweighed the
Russian losses.57

For the remainder of September, the

Japanese cautiously advanced northward as their adversaries
gave ground. An attempted Russian counteroffensive in
October proved to be a costly failure.58
Meanwhile, to the south, Nogi's Third Army struggled to
reduce the Russian garrison in Port Arthur. Nogi, who had
easily captured Port Arthur in November of 1894 during the
war with China,59

initially expected a similarly rapid

Russian collapse. He was gravely mistaken. Despite
debilitating sickness, constant bickering among the Russian
garrison's commanders, and sporadic bombardments from Togo's
navy, the Russian forces there heroically resisted Japanese
pressure. The efficient, hard-working commander of the
fortress, Lieutenant-General Constantine Smirnov, endeavored
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to improve long-neglected defensive positions in the hills
surrounding the harbor. Furthermore, after Port Arthur's
fleet returned for the last time following the battle of the
Yellow Sea on August 10, 1904, the garrison mounted the
ships' guns on the hills in an effort to counter the threat
posed by Nogi's army.60
Undaunted, the Japanese general attempted to overwhelm
the Russians with a frontal assault on August 19; by August
23, the Russians had repulsed the enemy attackers,
inflicting thousands of casualties.61

In late September,

Nogi's forces made unsuccessful and costly efforts to
capture forts along the Russian line of defense, and also
the strategic heights which afforded a commanding view of
the harbor. Finally, armed with eleven-inch Krupp siege guns
imported from Germany, the Japanese army pounded the
garrison and the town incessantly, driving many Russian
defenders into underground bunkers.62

This barrage

gradually eroded the garrison's capacity to resist. At the
end of November, Nogi tried to capture the heights again;
though thousands of Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded
in this attack, the crucial promontories were nevertheless
in Japanese possession by December 5. Soon, Japanese
artillery guns appeared on their summits, from which they
dealt the final blows to Port Arthur's fleet and garrison.
Ultimately, the garrison's chief commander,

Lieutenant-General Anatole Stoessel, was compelled to
surrender to Nogi on January 2, 1905.63
The fall of Port Arthur sparked varying reactions
across the United States. Japanese students at Yale
University, after overcoming initial disbelief, ecstatically
embraced one another in their dormitory's halls.64

Articles

in the New York Times on January 3 captured the drama of the
long siege, describing the fortress as a "veritable hell" in
which the isolated Russian defenders eventually had little
more than bayonets with which to fend off the Japanese
onslaughts.65

Another article reflected briefly upon the

then unknown human cost which Japan had paid for the capture
of Port Arthur:

Japanese energy has prevailed (over Russian
stubbornness), but at what a terrible price the
world is as yet in ignorance. All that is
known is that the cost in human life was
fearful, and that in modern times, no
military commander had previously dared
sacrifice men as Nogi sacrificed them in the
(Liaodong) Peninsula.66

Lastly, declaring that "the Gibraltar of the Far East is in
a heap of ruins,"67

a Times editorialist demanded an

immediate peaceful solution to the conflict between Russia
and Japan, even if international intervention should prove
necessary to separate the combatants:
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Why should not the impartial world now at last
intervene to stop the further effusion of blood,
and to save brave but unready Russia the
consequence of the defeats arising from her own
unpreparedness to execute the bold programme
she has framed? Is it not clear that Japan has
won the war?...How can France possibly desire
that her ally (Russia) shall weaken itself still
further in the prosecution of a war which can have
no triumphs, and which only stupid stubbornness
can refuse to accept as already decided?68

Furthermore, the editorial prophetically warned,
"...there are already ominous signs of what the prolongation
of the war may mean to Russia in the internal disturbance of
her empire, of how soon she may have to reckon with an enemy
of the autocracy yet more formidable than the Japanese."69
Less than three weeks later, on Sunday, January 22, 1905,
guards in front of Tsar Nicholas II's Winter Palace in St.
Petersburg fired into a large crowd of the "little father's"
subjects that had gathered to appeal to the Tsar to
undertake sorely needed reforms. Several hundred were either
killed or wounded.70

The "Bloody Sunday"^ massacre, ini part__

a product of the growing war-weariness afflicting the
country, ignited unprecedented revolutionary outbursts
against the autocratic government.
Despite such clamoring for peace, the war in Manchuria
rapidly approached its climax as Nogi's army, having finally
conquered Port Arthur, rushed northward to join the other
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three Japanese armies in support of Oyama's final attempt to
bring the Japanese campaign to a decisive conclusion. The
ensuing battle for the Manchurian capital of Mukden,
extending along a front line eighty miles in length and
pitting nearly 500,000 Russian and Japanese troops against
one another, was the largest engagement in human history
prior to the First World War. Once again, Oyama sought to
outflank his adversary in the clash which began on February
21, 1905. Before the Japanese forces could sever the Russian
line of retreat, however, Kuropatkin withdrew his remaining
troops northward on March 9. The Russian flight to Harbin,
forty miles distant, continued through the next day. The
final major clash of the war in Manchuria had cost both
armies dearly; Kuropatkin had lost one third of his
manpower, and Oyama had sacrificed one fourth of his forces
in his last, unsuccessful attempt to eliminate the Russian
army.71

Pending the influx from the west of Russian

reinforcements sufficient to alter the strategic balance in
Manchuria, Oyama wielded supremacy in the area of___________
hostilities. Disappointed, the Tsar replaced Kuropatkin with
Lieutenant-General Nicholas Linievich on March 12.72
Roosevelt enthusiastically received the news of this epic
conclusion of the land war. In an effusive note to Kaneko,
the President exclaimed, "Wonderful! Wonderful! Unparalleled
in the world. A great victory! The way things look,

everything is moving forward at great speed. Hurrah for
Japan 11173
Unfortunately for Japan, however, Oyama's forces
emerged from the great battle exhausted and unable to
advance further. To make matters worse, the ability of the
home islands to sustain the rigors of wartime production was
rapidly waning; unlike the Russians, the Japanese lacked the
means to replace the losses in personnel and materiel that
were incurred in the struggle for Mukden.74

Tokyo's secrecy

concealed this tenuous situation from foreign knowledge. As
a result, many Western leaders mistakenly believed that the
war in Manchuria had ended decisively in Japan's favor, and
that Oyama's forces were poised for further conquest. In his
letter to Senator Lodge on June 5, 1905, Roosevelt predicted
that "in a few months, more or less - certainly in a year or
so - the Japanese will take every Russian army or fortress
on the Pacific Slope, and will practically drive Russia east
of Lake Baikal."75
Further underscoring Japan's growing dominance in East
Asia was the covert use of Chinese collaborators by the
Japanese armies in Manchuria, in violation of the Chinese
neutrality which the United States had initially attempted
to uphold. Though the Qing government in Beijing declared
its neutrality at the outset of hostilities, the
independent-minded Yuan Shikai, then the chief administrator
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of northeastern China, secretly aided the Japanese in
various ways, in the hopes that they would champion China's
nationhood at war's end. Yuan established an elaborate
espionage network in which Chinese agents infiltrated
Russian bases in Manchuria, thus often obtaining valuable
military information which soon became known to Japanese
officers. He also supplied the Japanese troops with warm
clothing and blankets during the cold winter of 1904-05; in
contrast, the Russian soldiers had scant protection from the
elements. Though Russian statesmen soon suspected Chinese
collusion with Japan, and issued complaints to Washington,
the United States could do little to redress this problem,
except seek assurances of Chinese neutrality from Beijing,
whose leaders remained unaware of Yuan's covert
activities.76
The almost unbroken series of Japanese victories in
Korea and Manchuria gradually culminated in a crescendo.
Though the invading Japanese armies initially encountered
much smaller groups of Russian soldiers, reflecting Russia's
early underestimation of its foe, the latter stages of the
land campaign witnessed titanic engagements as the advancing
Japanese armies united and confronted the entire Russian
force in Manchuria. Although the Japanese armies ultimately
failed to annihilate their Russian adversaries (in contrast
to Togo's final naval victory), their impressive, albeit
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costly, triumphs wrought a sobering effect upon American
leaders, who quickly realized that Japan potentially
threatened the weakly defended claims of the United States
in East Asia with strength on land as well as at sea.
Japan's stunning victories inspired American
comparisons between Japanese military leaders and
illustrious Western men of arms. In the estimation of at
least one American newspaper in 1905, the Japanese army and
navy merited comparison with the European models which they
had originally sought to emulate. Reporting on Oyama's
triumph at Mukden in the New York Times on March 12, 1905,
the American military analyst Captain William G. Haan
likened the Japanese commander to Count Helmuth von Moltke,
the Chief of the formidable Prussian General Staff during
Otto von Bismarck's wars for German unification.77
Similarly, after Togo smashed the Baltic Fleet at Tsushima,
the Times lauded him as "Japan's (Horatio) Nelson," the
British naval hero of the Napoleonic Wars.78
Though he shared this admiration for Japan, Roosevelt
harbored apprehensions that military success against Russia
would infect Japan with a belligerent attitude that would
destroy the international friendships that the leaders in
Tokyo had striven to cultivate over the previous decades. As
early as June of 1904, the President, conferring with Kaneko
and Takahira Kogoro (Japan's ambassador to the United
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States), informed them of his belief that "their chief
danger was lest Japan might get the xbig head' and enter
into a general career of insolence and aggression; that such
a career would undoubtedly be temporarily very unpleasant to
the rest of the world, but that it would in the end be still
more unpleasant for Japan."79

Such misgivings were likely

magnified by reports indicating the intense patriotism and
dedication to duty among Japanese soldiers, which cast a
potentially menacing aspect upon their victories. In his
memoir Human Bullets, a postwar best-seller in Japan,
Lieutenant Sakurai Tadayoshi, a participant in the siege of
Port Arthur, captured in words the ethos of the Japanese
soldiers

When I offered my last prayers - the last, I then
believed they were - before the family shrine of my
ancestors (at the outset of the war), I felt a thrill
going all through me, as if they were giving me a
solemn injunction, saying, "Thou art not thy own.
For His Majesty's sake, thou shalt go to save the
nation from calamity, ready to bear even the crushing
of thy bones, and the tearing of thy flesh. Disgrace
not thy ancestors by an act of cowardice.1,80

Furthermore, in retrospective response to a note written by
an astonished Russian officer which declared, "The Japanese
army knows how to march, but not how to retreat,"81
retorted,

Sakurai
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"Back-roving" was ridiculed by the old warriors of
Japan - our modern fighters also despise the idea
of retreating. It may be a mistake, but "to show
one's back to the enemy" has always been
considered the greatest disgrace a samurai could
bring upon himself. This idea is the central
military principle of the people of Japan. This
note of the Russian general is good testimony
to the spirit pervading our ranks, "determined
to the death" and to fight on with strenuous
perseverance. Every time we fought, we won,
because we did not believe in retreating.82

American characterizations of the Japanese soldier
corroborated Sakurai's sweeping prose. Accompanying his
father, the young Douglas MacArthur encountered the
personnel of Japan's army for the first time in the autumn
of 1904. During his visit, this future opponent of the armed
might of Japan met the chief Japanese wartime commanders,
whom he described years later as "grim, taciturn, aloof men
of iron character and unshakeable purpose."83

Moreover,

MacArthur recalled, "(the Japanese soldier's) almost
fanatical belief in and reverence for his Emperor impressed
me indelibly."84

Lieutenant-Colonel Edward J. McClernand,

who observed the Japanese soldiers in Manchuria- after they
won the battle of Mukden, later referred to the Japanese
army as a "military machine"85

whose component parts were

paragons of "intelligence, patriotism, abstemiousness,

(and)

obedience to, and inborn respect for, legally constituted
authority."86

Further, Lloyd Griscom, the American
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ambassador to Japan, later asserted that "the Japanese were
probably the greatest marchers in the world," noting that
"men who had spent their lives toiling in the fields on a
diet of rice found it no hardship to plod along all day with
heavy packs on their backs."87

The formidable army that

emerged from such descriptions contrasted alarmingly with
its contemporary American counterpart.
Understandably, military success against Russia wrought
a profound change in Japan's national self-image. As
historian Akira Iriye has pointed out, "The Japanese, who
for so many years had been accustomed to deferring to
everything Western and feeling inferior to white people, now
realized that they were equal to any race, any nation in the
world. They were finding through experience that men were
all equal, that their racial differences were immaterial,
and what counted was their power, intelligence, and
morality."88

Former Foreign Minister Okuma Shigenobu

captured this new national confidence in a wartime speech:
"The war, the Japanese feel, proves that there is nothing
that Westerners do which Asians cannot do, or that there is
nothing Westerners try that Asians cannot also try."89

This

awareness of parity with the Western nations fueled an
expansionistic impulse which carried a strong national sense
of mission in East Asia. The first issue of the
nationalistic magazine Katsudo no Nihon (Active Japan)

sounded the charge in May of 1904 with proclamations of
"Japan's inevitable expansion.1,90

Subsequent issues

articulated the global vision of Japanese expansionists. In
March of 1905, Ozaki Yukio, the mayor of Tokyo, wrote, "Now
that Japan has achieved world-power status, we must stop
being content with crouching in a small corner of the earth.
We must broaden our vision and venture out to all parts of
the world - Africa, South America, North America, everywhere
in east and west - in order to make the whole universe our
sphere of action."91

Simultaneously, these spokesmen for

the new Japan expounded upon their nation's duty to lead the
rest of Asia on the road to modernity. Yano Ryukei, author
of Sekai ni okeru Nihon no shorai (Japan's Future in the
World), published in February of 1905, argued that Japan
should acquire a position of influence in East Asia
analogous to that of the United States in the Western
Hemisphere and that of Britain in Africa and Australia.92
As hostilities with Russia drew to a close, these
Japanese nationalists did not foresee future animosity
toward the United States, despite its growing position in
East Asia and its own sense of mission there. Though they
acknowledged that the possibility of Japanese-American
commercial rivalry in Asia and the Pacific loomed on the
horizon, they confidently predicted a cooperation between
the two nations based upon a shared commitment to "peaceful

progress" in the world arena.93

The American role in the

restoration of peace between Japan and Russia and in postwar
Asia would undermine this optimistic forecast.
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CHAPTER II:

THEODORE ROOSEVELT "ACTS UPON HIS OWN INITIATIVE":

BRINGING THE BELLIGERENTS TO THE PEACE TABLE, 1905

As the Russo-Japanese struggle raged, Roosevelt
channeled his characteristic boldness into promoting his
vision of international equilibrium in Europe and Asia. In
the words of historian Howard K. Beale, the President
"dreamed of...a world in which the imperial powers would
live at peace with one another" through mutual recognition
of territorial spheres of influence. Jealously guarding
their domains against foreign penetration, the imperial
powers would mutually check their expansionist
tendencies. This understanding among the "civilized" nations
of the world would enable them to focus upon the containment
and tutelage of the "backward" peoples under their
jurisdiction.1

In this context, Roosevelt sought to commit

the United States to redressing imbalances which threatened
the stability of the world arena. Conversing with the German
statesman Hermann von Eckardstein, he asserted that "in
fact, we (Americans) are becoming, owing to our strength and
geographical situation, more and more the balance of power
of the whole globe."2
In 1905, Roosevelt seized two opportunities to actuate
his conception of America's proper role upon the
international stage. On March 31 of that year, Kaiser
Wilhelm II delivered an incendiary speech in Tangier in
French Morocco, in which he denied the existence of French
sovereignty over the North African nation. This gesture, an
49

attempt by the German monarch to arrest the extension of
French power abroad and to test the strength of the
embryonic Anglo-French Entente, prompted Roosevelt to
persuade Berlin to submit the Moroccan question to
international arbitration. After several delays, a
conference was finally convened in Algeciras, Spain, in
January of 1906. Ultimately, acting on Roosevelt's advice,
Germany acknowledged French control of Morocco, in return
for a French promise to open its colony to international
commerce. The outcome of the Algeciras Conference restored a
veneer of stability among the involved European nations,
although the episode reinforced Anglo-French ties against
Germany.3
The war between Russia and Japan provided the second
occasion for Roosevelt to realize his country's potential as
a guardian of international equilibrium. From the outset of
hostilities, Roosevelt, his pro-Japanese sympathies
notwithstanding, privately wished for the continued presence
of Russia in East Asia to serve as a counterweight against
Japanese expansionism. He perceived that Japanese domination
of the region could prove as detrimental to American "Open
Door" policy objectives as had the Russian domination. As
early as March 19, 1904, he expressed in a letter to his
friend Cecil Arthur Spring Rice (then the secretary to the
British delegation in St. Petersburg) a hopeful supposition
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that "the two powers will fight until both are fairly well
exhausted, and that then peace will come on terms which will
not mean the creation of either a yellow peril or a Slav
peril.”4

The astonishing pace of Japanese arms through the

succeeding months gradually convinced the President that a
rapid cessation of the war was necessary to preserve Russian
influence in the contested region. Writing to Whitelaw Reid,
the American ambassador to Britain, on June 5, 19 05,
Roosevelt admitted that he "should be sorry to see Russia
driven out of East Asia,” and averred that "driven out she
will surely be if the war goes on.”5

In sum, he stated to

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge on June 16, 1905, "It is best that
(Russia) should be left face to face with Japan so that each
may have a moderative action on the other."6
Equally important to the President was the prevention
of another concerted European interference with the eventual
peace settlement, akin to that which had compelled Japan to
dilute its terms of peace with China in 1895. A similar
multilateral intervention between Japan and Russia __________
threatened not only another denial of the fruits of victory
to Japan, but also a renewed Western dissection of China. By
1905, Roosevelt believed, the United States had finally
acquired a position in East Asia sufficient to prevent such
a repetition. Soon after the Russo-Japanese War erupted,
Roosevelt warned Paris and Berlin "in the most polite and
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discreet fashion" that, in the event of a second European
collusion against Japan, the United States would "promptly
side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary
on her behalf."7

Japan's victories steeled his resolve to

support Japan against any possible European intrusion. In
early January of 1905, soon after the fall of Port Arthur,
Secretary of State John Hay noted in his diary that
Roosevelt "was quite firm in his view that we cannot permit
Japan to be robbed a second time of the fruits of her
victory."8
At an early stage in the war, the President's specific
notions of what constituted Japan's legitimate fruits of
victory had already begun to crystallize. On June 11, 1904,
in conversation with Takahira and Kaneko, Roosevelt opined
that Korea and Port Arthur belonged under Japanese hegemony.
Though he favored the restoration of Manchuria to China, he
was convinced that the moribund Qing government would
require Japanese advisors to govern the area efficiently.
Lastly, the President championed a Japanese equivalent o f _
the Monroe Doctrine, in which Japanese influence in the
Yellow Sea would mirror American influence in the Caribbean
Sea. He then hastened to add that he was merely stating his
personal views, and not speaking as the President of the
United States.9
On February 6, 1905, Roosevelt communicated these ideas

in a note to the new American ambassador to Russia, George
von Lengerke Meyer: "Japan ought to have a protectorate over
Korea (which has shown its utter inability to stand by
itself), and ought to succeed to Russia's right in and
around Port Arthur, while I should hope to see Manchuria
restored to China.”10

When Collier's reporter Richard Barry

intimated to Roosevelt on February 21 that European
intervention might once again threaten Japan's claim to Port
Arthur, the President boomed, "Retain Port Arthur! If in no
other way, I would make (Japan) hold Port Arthur! She has
won it, and it is hers, never to be surrendered again. Japan
must hold Port Arthur and she must hold Korea. These two
points are already settled."11

Early the next month, Barry,

on Roosevelt's instructions, relayed this statement across
the Pacific to the journalist George Kennan, a confidant of
the President who had close ties with Japanese leaders. He
in turn reported Roosevelt's words verbatim to Prime
Minister Katsura Taro.12
At this time, Japan's leaders were still striving to

_.

delineate their terms of peace. Cognizance of Russia's vast
material resources, and of Japan's comparative weakness, had
made most of them painfully aware of Japan's inability to
wrest more than modest terms from its adversary even before
the commencement of hostilities. Through the early months of
1905, reports of General Oyama's failure to crush the
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Russian army in Manchuria confirmed this sobering reality.
As early as August of 1904, Prime Minister Katsura's initial
enumeration of Japan's war aims reflected this quest for
moderation. He held that the indispensable prerequisites for
a durable peace between Russia and Japan were Russian
recognition of Japan's "freedom of action" in Korea, cession
of theLiaodong Peninsula and Port Arthur
removal of Russian troops from

to Japan, and the

Manchuria. Katsura then

listed as optional stipulations the transfer of Sakhalin
Island

(which Russia had taken from Japan in 1875) back to

Japan,

the payment to Japan ofa war indemnity, and the

granting to Japan of full fishing privileges along the
Siberian coast.13
Others in Tokyo did not share the Prime Minister's
advocacy of limited demands, noting the tremendous financial
and military burdens which Japan had borne in a war of
self-defense provoked by Russian expansionism. In the same
month that Katsura drafted his proposed terms, Foreign
Minister Komura Jutaro presented his own set of objectives..
At the top of his list was the call for an indemnity to
reimburse Japan for its wartime expenses, and elsewhere
appeared the demand for Sakhalin.14

Although Katsura's

comparatively restrained definition of war objectives
prevailed at this early phase of the conflict, Komura
privately clung to his agenda.

The following January, London successfully obtained
from Tokyo a comprehensive statement of Japanese war aims.
Soon after the fall of Port Arthur, British Foreign Minister
Lord Henry Lansdowne instructed his ambassador to Japan, Sir
Claude MacDonald, to request an enumeration of peace terms
from Komura, in the hopes of expediting negotiations between
the belligerents. On January 25, 1905, the Japanese Foreign
Minister asserted to MacDonald that Tokyo anticipated
demanding three "inflexibly required" conditions: cession of
Port Arthur and adjacent territory, restoration of the
remainder of Manchuria to China, with Japanese control of
the railway linking Port Arthur and Harbin, and
acknowledgment of Japanese suzerainty over Korea. In
addition, Komura indicated that an indemnity and other
issues would be discussed with the Russians. After MacDonald
commented that the indemnity question could present
difficulties, Komura retorted that Russia might choose to
pay a small indemnity at that time, instead of a larger one
later (against Japan's mounting wartime debts). Komura
concluded by proclaiming his government's insistence that
St. Petersburg initiate the quest for peace. Upon receiving
this information, Lansdowne confidentially sent it to
Washington, adding a comment that British leaders did not
deem the Japanese terms exhorbitant.15
Roosevelt reacted to this official statement of Japan's

peace proposals with uncharacteristic doubt. Despite the
sanguine remarks about Japan's prospects which he had
expressed to Kaneko and Takahira the previous June, the
President did not believe that Japan would gain all of
Komura's terms. He told Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, the
British ambassador to Washington, that Tokyo was demanding
more than its armed forces had been able to conquer. To
compel Russian submission to the terms, he asserted, the
Japanese armies would first have to capture Harbin.16

The

great (albeit inconclusive) armed triumph at Mukden
seemingly emboldened Japan's Foreign Minister. On March 31,
1905, Takahira announced to Roosevelt Komura's assertion
that Japan could continue fighting for another year, and
that the conflict would persist until the Tsar himself sued
for peace. The Japanese ambassador then discussed Komura's
belief that international precedents entitled Japan to an
indemnity, and hinted that the Foreign Minister was also
considering the cession of Sakhalin as part of Japan's price
for peace.17
The President reacted ambivalently to these anticipated
demands for money and territory. Although he informed
Takahira of his personal hope that Japan would be able to
receive financial compensation from Russia for wartime
expenses, Roosevelt perhaps recalled that Japan had invested
its 1895 indemnity from China in large-scale rearmament. If
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Japan were to finance a similar program with an indemnity
extracted from Russia, the island nation could prove a
serious threat to Roosevelt's vision of the postwar balance
of power in East Asia and the Pacific region. The President
warned Takahira of probable Russian inability to pay a large
indemnity, and suggested that intransigence on this issue
might damage Japan's hard-won prestige in the world arena.
Given these factors, Roosevelt advised Takahira against
seeking an indemnity. Regarding Japanese designs on
Sakhalin, the President pointed out that the coveted
territory was a sparsely populated island with little
intrinsic value, hardly worth the status of a major war
objective.18
These Japanese demands for payment and territory
continued to trouble Roosevelt through the next several
weeks. In May of 1905, he wrote to his friend Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, stating that Japan should eschew terms that
would induce Russia to continue fighting, rather than accept
defeat. Writing to Meyer in the same month, the President
averred that, if he were a Russian, he would not submit to
conditions that included an indemnity and cession of
territory. In conversation with Kaneko in mid-May, Roosevelt
reiterated his opinion that Japan should abandon any plans
to demand an indemnity and Sakhalin from Russia. When Kaneko
cited the precedent occasioned by the French indemnity
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payment and cession of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany after the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, Roosevelt pointed out that,
in 1871, German forces had occupied Paris. In contrast,
Japanese forces had not yet occupied Russian territory.19
The President mistakenly feared that these demands
originated among military leaders intoxicated with their
armed success against Russia. Unbeknownst to him, Japan's
strategists had been painfully aware that prolonged
hostilities would reverse their hard-won gains in Manchuria
since March of 1905. Although they had achieved an almost
unbroken series of victories in the land war, they knew that
Japan lacked the human and material resources to wage a
protracted war against the largest nation in the world. They
therefore warned their government that Japan was ill able to
seek sweeping concessions that would likely steel Russian
resolve to continue fighting. Contrary to Roosevelt's
belief, Foreign Minister Komura remained the primary
agitator for an indemnity and cession of Sakhalin.20
Komura's minority position was reinforced on April 21,
1905, when the government leaders in Tokyo officially
determined Japan's peace terms. Three conditions were
considered "indispensable": freedom of action for Japan in
Korea, mutual evacuation of Russian and Japanese military
personnel from Manchuria, and cession to Japan of Port
Arthur and the railway linking the harbor with Harbin. The
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Foreign Minister's preferred demands for an indemnity and
the cession of Sakhalin were once again listed as "items not
absolutely indispensable.1,21
The government concealed these deliberations on peace
terms, as well as the somber reports from army commanders,
from the Diet and the Japanese public. Japanese citizens,
receiving news of the war through the filter of governmental
censorship, believed by the spring of 1905 that the Russian
forces in Manchuria were on the verge of collapse, that
Oyama was poised for further great victories against them,
j

and that Japan could therefore expect generous concessions
from its adversary. Specifically, they anticipated an
indemnity by the closing stages of hostilities. Russia had
instigated war with its occupation of Manchuria and Port
Arthur and its machinations in Korea. Japan therefore
deserved reimbursement from Russian coffers for its war of
self-defense. Precedents established by previous wars in
East Asia further buttressed Japan's claim for reparations.
China, defeated in the Opium War (1839-42), the Arrow War
(1858-60), the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), and the Boxer
Rebellion (1900-01), had paid large sums to its victorious
opponents in each case. Having endured high wartime taxes in
1904-05, the Japanese people feared that failure to gain an
indemnity from Russia would condemn them to continued
onerous financial burdens through the immediate postwar

period. Japan's business leaders observed that Japan would
need monetary compensation in order to repay its wartime
debts and to underwrite future investments in Korea and
Manchuria. Without payment from Russia, they predicted, the
Japanese economy, which had enjoyed wartime prosperity,
would falter once peace was restored.22

Meanwhile, Japanese

jingoes formed groups such as the Tairo Doshikai
(Anti-Russian Comrades' Society), which agitated for
obtainment of an indemnity, Sakhalin, and Russian holdings
in Manchuria. These groups also convened mass meetings
throughout the country to galvanize the Japanese populace
against a "dishonorable" peace.23

As historian Shumpei

Okamoto has observed, "In their desperate determination, a
large segment of the Japanese public grew increasingly
unrealistic and irrational.1,24
During its deliberations over proposed peace terms, the
Japanese government also received considerable pressure from
its military leaders and from France to initiate the
peacemaking process. Worried by Kaiser Wilhelm II's
provocations in French Algeria, Paris began in March of 1905
an attempt to end the Asian war in order to restore the
Russian counterweight to German ambitions in Europe and
Africa. In mid-March, seeking to coerce Russia to sue for
peace, French bankers in St. Petersburg abruptly cancelled
their plans to extend another war loan to the Russian

government.25

This maneuver prodded Tsar Nicholas II to

take a tentative step toward negotiation with Japan. On
March 21, the Russian monarch instructed his ambassador to
Paris, Alexander Nelidov, to communicate with the Japanese
through French Foreign Minister Theophile Delcasse. On April
5, Delcasse informed Japan's ambassador Motono Ichiro of his
belief that Russia would agree to commence peace
negotiations, provided that Japan would foreswear designs on
Russian territory and demands for an indemnity. After Motono
cabled Tokyo with this information, Komura gave a lukewarm
response. The Japanese Foreign Minister argued that, despite
the nearly unbroken series of Russian military defeats, St.
Petersburg was attempting to dictate the parameters of a
peace conference.26

In addition, the Japanese government

remained wary of accepting the good offices of a Russian
ally, especially when French territories in Africa and Asia
were then supplying Russia's Baltic Fleet with coal and
other provisions as it crawled eastward.27

(In mid-April,

Admiral Rozhdestvenski's ill-fated armada would stagger into
Camranh Bay in French Indochina.28)
This external pressure to begin the quest for peace
sparked heated debate among government leaders in Tokyo. At
a deadlocked conference on April 8, the senior members of
the Genro advocated initiating the call for negotiations.
They cautioned that continuation of the war not only would

threaten to reverse the tide of battle in Manchuria, but
also would exacerbate Japan's foreign debt. In contrast,
Katsura and Komura adamantly insisted that Russia should be
the first to request an end to hostilities. They contended
that Russia would perceive a Japanese overture as a sign of
weakness. Cognizant that the Baltic Fleet was then inching
its way toward the war zone, the two ministers also did not
wish to project abroad the impression that it intimidated
Japan. After more than a week of dissension, the Genro
finally overruled Katsura and Komura on April 17. On that
day, Tokyo decided to send confidential hints to Washington
to indicate Japan's readiness to open negotiations with
Russia.29
Japanese plans to turn to the United States to request
arbitration at an opportune juncture in the war antedated
the outbreak of hostilities in February of 1904. Europe's
extensive alliance system, which included both Russia and
Japan by 1904, would likely prejudice a potential European
mediator. France's abortive attempt to intercede in April of
1905 confirmed this belief. Also, memories of the 1895
Triple Intervention by France, Germany, and Russia on
China's behalf during the Shimonoseki Conference continued
to rankle Japan's leaders. The United States, isolated from
the vagaries of European diplomacy, appeared best suited for
the role of an impartial arbiter. For this reason, Tokyo had
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dispatched Kaneko to Washington early in the war as a
special emissary to plead Japan's case to the American
people, and to cultivate support for Japan among
American leaders.30
Immediately after electing to request American
mediation, Tokyo began to send subtle signals to Washington.
On April 18, Takahira discussed Japan's recent rejection of
Delcasse's overture with Secretary of War William Howard
Taft, and asked him to apprise Roosevelt. Taft then sent a
confidential telegram to the President, stating that
although Japan had refused the French offer, it "had no
intention to close the door to friendly offices exerted
purely for the purpose of bringing the belligerents
together." Indeed, Japanese leaders judged that "it (was)
not unlikely that the friendly good offices of some Power
might be necessary." In reply, Roosevelt accepted the
Japanese position that "negotiations should be directly
between Russia and Japan, and should include all the
possible terms of peace," and added as a proviso his
assumption that "Japan (was) adhering to her position of
maintaining the Open Door in Manchuria and restoring it to
China."31

In a separate, private letter to Taft, Roosevelt

explained that his endorsement of direct negotiations on all
terms of peace did not imply his approval of Japan's demands
for an indemnity or cession of territory. Instead, the
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President remained noncommittal on these points.32
Tokyo readily acceded to Roosevelt's injunction
regarding Manchuria on April 25. In a message announcing his
government's agreement with the President, Komura further
solicited advice from the American leader on the best means
by which Japan could "pave the way" for negotiations with
Russia. Simultaneously, Ambassador Lloyd Griscom cabled
Washington from Tokyo, describing Japan's eagerness for
peace, and asserting that its leaders sought Roosevelt's
assistance in effecting a settlement with Russia. Somewhat
taken aback by these signs of Japanese war-weariness, the
President informed Taft on April 27 that he was "a good deal
puzzled" by these reports, but urged Taft to arrange "an
absolutely frank talk" between Takahira and Count Arthur
Cassini, the Russian ambassador in Washington.33
Komura immediately balked at this suggestion from the
President, refusing to open such crucial discussions with "a
man of Cassini's known character."34

Instead, the Japanese

Foreign Minister continued to appeal to Roosevelt
personally. On May 13, 1905, Takahira finally approached him
with a direct request for assistance from Tokyo. Komura
asked Roosevelt if he believed the time was ripe for
commencing peace negotiations, and further inquired whether
he "would be so kind as to go to the trouble of bringing the
two nations together for a meeting on his own initiative" if
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he judged a rapid end to the war to be necessary. The
Japanese Foreign Minister hastened to add that his nation
was not seeking the President's advice from a position of
weakness, asserting that Japan was "in the best possible
position" financially and militarily.35

In response,

Roosevelt reminded Takahira of Russia's persistent
unwillingness to accept defeat, as evidenced by the slow
approach of its Baltic Fleet, which was then preparing to
embark from Camranh Bay upon the final leg of its voyage to
Vladivostok.36

The President counseled Takahira that Russia

would interpret an overture from Tokyo at that juncture as
evidence that Admiral Rozhdestvenski's decrepit armada
intimidated Japan. He concluded by averring that Japan
should defer further peace initiatives until after its navy
had dealt with the Russian fleet.37
Exactly two weeks later, on May 27-28, Admiral Togo
smashed the Baltic Fleet in the Straits of Tsushima. This
resounding triumph convinced both Tokyo and Washington that
an opportune moment to commence peace negotiations had at
last arrived. On May 31, Komura cabled Takahira with
confidential instructions to request Roosevelt's assistance
in arranging a conference with Russia. Still anxious to
conceal from Russian knowledge the fervent Japanese desire
for peace, Tokyo indicated that the President should invite
the two belligerents to commence negotiations "directly and
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entirely of his own initiative.11 On the next day, June 1,
Takahira formally presented this message to Roosevelt.
Though the President willingly accepted this task, he feared
that Japan's proposed demands for an indemnity and cession
of territory threatened to sabotage prospects for a
successful conference. Roosevelt repeated his warning to
Takahira of probable Russian unwillingness to pay war
reparations. Tokyo's invocation of the precedent of the 1871
French indemnity to Germany, he asserted, "might be
reasonable if the Japanese armies were surrounding Moscow."
Instead, the President suggested that, if Japan were to
abandon its financial designs and accept a partition of
Sakhalin, Russia would agree to ending the war.38
Since the beginning of 1905, Roosevelt himself had been
striving to persuade Russia to sue for peace before the
Japanese military onslaught undermined his vision of the
postwar balance of power in East Asia. As early as December
of 1904, he had resolved to replace Robert McCormick, the
American ambassador to St. Petersburg, with the more adept
George von Lengerke Meyer. Writing to Meyer on December 26,
he characterized that position as "the most important post
in the diplomatic service from the standpoint of work to be
done."39

The fall of Port Arthur and the eruption of

revolution against the Tsarist regime the following January
underscored the urgency of preventing further bloodshed in
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Manchuria, and Meyer presented his credentials to Russian
Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamsdorff in February.40
Meanwhile, Roosevelt prevailed upon Chicago Tribune
correspondent John Callan O'Laughlin, who had close ties
with the Russian embassy in Washington, to inform Cassini of
his conviction that, unless Russia could maintain six
hundred thousand men in Manchuria and achieve success with
its Baltic Fleet, it should make peace with Japan.
Simultaneously, the President gave the same statement to
Jules Jusserand, the French ambassador to the United States,
in the hopes that France could influence its Russian ally.
Neither initiative brought results. Though he strongly
wished for peace, French Foreign Minister Delcasse declined
to advise the Russian government, worried that Russia would
blame France for an unfavorable peace settlement. Rather,
Delcasse urged Roosevelt to persuade Japan to begin the
peacemaking process on moderate terms. Upon hearing rumors
about Japan's possible demands for money and territory,
Cassini defiantly told O'Laughlin that only a nation with
two remaining soldiers, and those in retreat, would submit
to such conditions. Russia still had a massive army in
Manchuria and the Baltic Fleet. His nation, Cassini
declared, was not yet beaten.41
The subsequent defeat at Mukden and the suspension of
wartime loans from French bankers failed to dampen Russian
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resolve. A conference between Roosevelt and Cassini in late
March revealed that the attitude of the Russian ambassador
had not changed. When the President attempted to convince
Cassini that peace served the national interests of both
Russia and the United States, which did not wish to witness
the elimination of Russian influence in East Asia, the
Russian argued that his nation would never pay an indemnity
or surrender territory to obtain peace. Roosevelt queried
about the course Russia would take if Vladivostok and Harbin
were to fall to the Japanese army. In reply, Cassini claimed
that Japan could ill afford extended operations in
Manchuria. Unaware at the time of the exhaustion of Oyama's
forces, Roosevelt shot back that Russian persistence derived
from a "dangerous delusion.1,42
Meyer fared little better in St. Petersburg. Tsar
Nicholas II had quickly lost interest in the secret attempt
to approach Japan through France which he had undertaken in
late March of 1905. He soon received external encouragement
to persevere. Alarmed by the revolutionary tensions
convulsing Russia, German Chancellor Bernhard furst von
Bulow believed that an unfavorable peace settlement would
exacerbate the unrest, potentially jeopardizing not only the
Russian monarchy, but also the other monarchies on the
European continent. In April of 1905, Bulow sent Wilhelm
II's brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, to St. Petersburg to
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assure the Tsar that time was on the side of the Russian
forces in Manchuria. Prince Henry brought with him a report
from the German General Staff which stated that Sakhalin and
Vladivostok lay within Japan's reach, but that the Japanese
advance would eventually ebb in the vast Siberian wasteland,
where Oyama's armies could only languish at a ruinous cost
to Japan. As a result, the German assessment concluded,
Japan could not coerce Russia to sue for peace. His resolve
steeled, Nicholas II then saw the Baltic Fleet as the
instrument for reversing the tide of war. Triumphantly,
Prince Henry telegraphed Berlin, "Tsar determined to
continue war in spite of strong agitation for peace. He pins
his whole hopes on Rozhdestvenski...Tsar in calm and normal
spirits." Meyer glumly commented in his diary that there was
no hope for peace until after an engagement between the
Japanese navy and the Baltic Fleet.43

An exasperated

Roosevelt fumed in a May 13 letter to Cecil Arthur Spring
Rice, "I loathe the Russian system of government...Just at
the moment, Russia is riding a high horse and will not talk
peace.1,44
The near annihilation of Rozhdestvenski's armada
finally undermined the Tsar's determination to prolong
hostilities. Dazed, he recorded in his diary "the awful news
about the destruction of almost the entire squadron."
British ambassador Sir Charles Hardinge noted that the naval
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battle had at last awakened the denizens of the Russian
capital to the horrors of the distant war, since many of the
officers commanding the doomed vessels had come from the
nation's elite families. Meyer cabled to Washington his
impression that the destruction of the Baltic Fleet had
"really moved" St. Petersburg for the first time in the
conflict.45
Moreover, by the beginning of June, the Tsar dimly
recognized the gravity of the domestic turbulence afflicting
Russia, which had escalated dramatically since the "Bloody
Sunday" massacre of January 22, 1905. Widespread strikes led
by workers and students had paralyzed Russian industry and
closed Russian schools. In May of 1905, political liberals
had joined forces in a Union of Unions, which vehemently
demanded the creation of a legislative assembly in the
Russian government. People of various nationalities subsumed
under the Russian Empire, such as the Poles, Finns, and
Ukrainians, clamored for autonomy. The climax of the
national upheaval occurred in late June of 1905, when
Russian sailors aboard the battleship Potemkin, stationed at
the Black Sea port of Odessa, mutinied and sailed for
Rumania.46

Further defeats in the war with Japan would

likely exacerbate this unrest.
Observing these tumultuous events from Berlin, a
dismayed Kaiser Wilhelm II reached a conclusion which

71
opposed that of his Chancellor. Conferring with American
ambassador Charlemagne Tower, the German emperor remarked,
•'Unless peace is made, they will kill the Tsar,11 and added
that the assassination of Nicholas II would endanger all
European monarchs. On June 3, 1905, Wilhelm II urged his
cousin "Nicky" to seek peace, contending that hopes for a
reversal of the military tide had died with the Baltic
Fleet. He strongly advised the Tsar to accept American good
offices, averring that "if anybody in the world is able to
influence the Japanese or induce them to be reasonable in
their proposals, it is President Roosevelt." On the same
day, the Kaiser sent a message to Roosevelt in which he
offered his assistance in any efforts the President made on
behalf of peace.47

Though he appreciated the German

leader's support, Roosevelt was troubled by Berlin's
supposition that he would persuade Japan to dilute its peace
terms. In a private note to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge on
June 5, the President described the German overture,
commenting that he "did not desire to be asked to squeeze
terms out of Japan favorable to Russia."48
Instead, urging the Tsar to accept a peace conference
on June 5, Roosevelt disavowed any intention of influencing
Japan: "The President believes it would be better for the
representatives of the two powers to discuss the whole peace
question themselves, rather than for any outside power to do
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more than arrange the meeting.” His entreaty also honored
Japan's fervent desire to maintain the secrecy of its
initial request for American intercession: "If Russia will
consent to such a meeting, the President will try to get
Japan's consent, acting simply on his own initiative."49

To

Lodge, Roosevelt confided his doubts as to whether this
message to St. Petersburg would persuade the Russian
government:

"I do not believe there is much chance of this

bringing about peace, for I suppose the Tsar, who seems in a
thoroughly Chinese mood, will refuse to do anything. If he
does, then all I can say is that his blood must be on his
own head...In any event, I have done what I could to help on
toward peace."50
Fortunately, Roosevelt's pessimism proved unfounded. On
June 7, Meyer presented Roosevelt's appeal to the Russian
monarch at Tsarskoe Selo. During an hour-long audience, the
American ambassador indicated that he had informed
Washington that Russia was not desperate for peace at any
price, and that excessive Japanese demands would rally the
Russian people behind the Tsar. Also, Meyer reassured
Nicholas II of the purity of Roosevelt's motives in calling
for a peace conference. In return, the Tsar informed Meyer
of his acceptance of the President's invitation, provided
that Russian approval remain confidential until Japan
likewise acceded. Nicholas II then added that Meyer had
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arrived at "a psychological moment," in which the Russian
ruler realized that Russian land, particularly Sakhalin, lay
vulnerable to further Japanese advances which could occur at
any time.51
On the evening of June 7, Roosevelt learned of the
Tsar's capitulation. The following day, he drafted a formal
invitation for the belligerents to enter into negotiations,
and sent it to Tokyo and St. Petersburg.52

The Japanese

government's acceptance of the President's overture elicited
mixed reactions from among the Japanese public. Though
American ambassador Lloyd Griscom later recalled that "an
aura of peace was in the air,"53 Roosevelt's invitation was
a "bolt out of the blue" for many of Japan's citizens. Still
oblivious of the increasingly tenuous position of Oyama's
forces, they confidently expected further armed triumphs,
and believed that only the destruction of the Russian army
could guarantee a durable peace in Manchuria. Consequently,
they judged Roosevelt's intercession premature. Eventual
acquiescence in governmental policy did not quell lingering
doubts concerning Japan's chances for successful
negotiations with Russia. Optimists stated in the Japanese
press their belief that Russia had requested peace
negotiations through the United States, and that Roosevelt
and the Japanese government had reviewed and approved
Russian terms prior to Tokyo's acceptance of American good
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offices. Less sanguine journalists held that Roosevelt's
invitation had actually derived from his own initiative,
rather than Russian desperation, and that the coming peace
conference would therefore not necessarily secure an
•'honorable peace" for Japan. Further, they reminded their
readers of the ignominious outcome of the 1895 Shimonoseki
Conference, and gloomily predicted another failure in
Japanese diplomacy.54
Russia's response to Roosevelt's overture created more
immediate problems. Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamsdorff
neglected to inform Cassini of the Tsar's assent to a
conference, thereby causing several days of confusion in
Washington in which the Russian ambassador insisted that
Meyer had misconstrued Nicholas II. Meanwhile, in St.
Petersburg, the Russian Foreign Minister blustered to
British ambassador Hardinge that only humanitarian
principles had compelled the Tsar to accept Roosevelt's
initiative, and that, in the absence of a public Japanese
call for peace, Russia was prepared to fight indefinitely.
Though Roosevelt received verbal assurances from Cassini
that Russia recognized the need for peace, Lamsdorff sent a
warning that Russia would "in no case accept conditions that
(did) not correspond to its national honor."55
This signal from St. Petersburg renewed Roosevelt's
concerns regarding Japan's peace terms. On June 8, the day
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on which he issued the invitations to the belligerent
capitals, he had told Kaneko that that he now supported
Japanese claims on Sakhalin, but remained opposed to the
quest for an indemnity. The President emphasized his fear
that Japanese insistence upon reparations would sabotage the
coming conference, and added that Russia's financial
disarray precluded its ability to compensate Japan's wartime
expenses. Roosevelt's efforts to enlist British aid in
persuading Japan to pursue more moderate demands proved
fruitless. Foreign Minister Lord Henry Lansdowne believed
Japan entitled to a substantial indemnity, despite
Hardinge's assessment on June 13 that Japan had little hope
of obtaining more than either a small payment or a
territorial cession instead of money from a nation that was
"still as arrogant as ever." In response, Lansdowne
exclaimed to Hardinge, "Is there any case of a war of this
kind in which the losing side has not had to pay for its
folly or ill luck?"56
Having accepted the President's invitation to discuss
peace, the belligerent governments, acting on his advice,
selected the Portsmouth Navy Yard, near Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, as the site for the upcoming conference.57
Choosing conferees presented a more formidable task. At
first, Prime Minister Katsura nominated Marquis Ito Hirobumi
to lead the Japanese delegation. In a meeting of the Genro
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and other leaders, Katsura asserted that the chief
negotiator for Japan needed to be a member of the Genro who
had the complete trust of the Emperor and the support of the
people. To the Emperor, the Prime Minister recommended Ito
as the chief and Komura as the second-ranking
plenipotentiaries. Across the Pacific, Roosevelt also hoped
Ito would head the Japanese peacemakers, believing that he
would exert a moderating influence upon his colleagues.58
Japan's senior statesman, however, declined. The Emperor had
relied heavily upon his counsel throughout the conflict, and
did not want him to leave Tokyo. Ito himself, who had
opposed Japan's drift toward war with Russia, believed that
the leaders responsible for instigating hostilities should
face the task of ending them. On one occasion, he stated,
"One must harvest the result of what one has sown. I started
the Sino-Japanese War, and therefore I naturally concluded
it. I consider it in order that the present war be concluded
by Katsura himself."59
Most importantly, Japan's leaders were already
beginning to realize that the peace settlement would in all
likelihood fall far short of public expectations. Lancelot
Lawton, wartime correspondent for the Daily Telegraph,
commented, "It was evident that the position of the Japanese
plenipotentiary was to be compared to that of a poker player
possessing an extremely doubtful hand."60

Ito perceived
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that, if he were to lead the peacemaking mission, he would
return home bearing the blame for its failure to obtain
satisfactory terms, and would alone confront the popular
wrath of Japan. His well-known prewar advocacy of
accommodation with Russia would render him especially
vulnerable to charges of leniency toward the enemy.61
After Ito refused to travel to Portsmouth, the Genro
then selected Foreign Minister Komura to lead Japan's
delegation. Ambassador Takahira would serve as the secondary
plenipotentiary. Genro members were extremely ambivalent
about appointing the headstrong Komura as Japan's chief
diplomat for the difficult negotiations ahead. Worried that
the Foreign Minister's fixation upon expansive terms would
jeopardize the conference, Navy Minister Yamamoto Gonnohyoe
sought reassurance from Komura during the Genro's discussion
of Japan's delegation: "It is our understanding that, if the
negotiations come to the point of rupture, you will make the
final decision only after you have obtained governmental
instructions. We would like to obtain your assurance on this
point for the sake of our peace of mind." Only after Komura
answered, "Of course!" did the Genro finally decide to elect
him to head the peace mission.62

To assist himself and

Takahira, however, Komura chose several individuals who
shared his hard-line views, including Honda Kumataro, his
private secretary, and Colonel Tachibana Kaichiro, military
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advisor to the peace mission.63
Meanwhile, a cabinet meeting on June 30 drafted the
final instructions to Japan's delegation. Once again, the
proposed peace terms reflected Japan's need to end the war
quickly. Three conditions were deemed "absolutely
indispensable to achieving our war aims and guaranteeing the
security of our Imperial nation forever” : Russian
acknowledgment of Japanese freedom of action in Korea,
mutual withdrawal of troops from Manchuria, and cession of
the portion of the Liaodong Peninsula which Russia had
leased from China, as well as the railway linking Port
Arthur and Harbin. Four conditions were considered
"relatively important," to be pursued "insofar as
circumstances permit": Russian reimbursement of Japan's
wartime expenses, the surrender to Japan of all Russian
warships that had sought refuge in neutral harbors, cession
of Sakhalin, and fishing rights along the coast of the
Maritime Provinces. Finally, two additional items were to be
used as bargaining points: future limitation of Russian
naval strength in the Far East, and conversion of
Vladivostok into a purely commercial port. This list of
conditions received Imperial sanction on July 5. The
Japanese delegation was to treat these instructions as
guidelines, rather than rigid demands. Komura would later
fully exploit this freedom of discretion, revising the terms
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to conform to his own agenda.64
The Russian search for emissaries proved even more
difficult. Initially, Nicholas II strove to avoid selecting
the able but unpopular Chairman of the Council of Ministers,
Sergei Witte. Though Witte had once ardently advocated
Russian commercial expansion in East Asia during his service
as Russia's Minister of Finance, the rise of Japanese power
in the years following the Sino-Japanese War had eventually
tempered his Asian ambitions. One of the few Russian leaders
who had opposed war with Japan in 1904, Witte had striven to
restore peace at an early stage in the conflict. During the
summer of 1904, he had attempted to open peace negotiations
through the Japanese ambassador to Britain, Count Hayashi
Tadasu. Outraged by this gesture, the Tsar had immediately
quashed it. In late February of 1905, worried that the
military debacle in Manchuria fueled the flames of
revolution, Witte submitted a written plea to Nicholas II
urging the commencement of negotiations. Warning that
continuation of the conflict would spell economic and
financial ruin for Russia, Witte vainly admonished the
monarch,

"In all things decision is requisite. But if

decision is indispensable in happiness, it is doubly
necessary in disaster. In disaster, resolution is the first
step towards safety. There should be no delay. Peace
pourparlers should at once be begun.1"65

Though Witte
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believed that his bold letter wrought a profound influence
upon the Tsar, he was mistaken.
Having ignored Witte's advice during the war, Nicholas
II was now unwilling to entrust him with the responsibility
of negotiating peace. Foreign Minister Lamsdorff, who
perceived the value of Witte's expertise on economic and
financial issues, strongly advocated the appointment of
Witte to the peace mission in his first recommendation to
the Tsar on June 24, 1905. After other candidates refused to
assume the unwelcome task of negotiating the conclusion of a
lost war, the Tsar finally offered it to Witte. Although he
accepted the assignment in order to serve his country and
his own personal ambitions, Witte acidly grumbled to Finance
Minister Vladimir Kokovtsov, "When a sewer has to be
cleaned, they send Witte; but as soon as work of a cleaner
and nicer kind appears, plenty of other candidates spring
up."66

Also at the head of the Russian delegation was Baron

Roman Rosen, Russia's prewar ambassador to Japan and
Cassini's designated successor in Washington.67
The day after he accepted the task of leading the
Russian mission to Portsmouth, Witte conferred with the
Tsar. Although Nicholas II affirmed his hopes for peace, he
emphasized his refusal to pay a kopek of indemnity or to
cede an inch of territory. The Tsar subsequently gave Witte
additional instructions designed to lay the foundations of
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an amicable postwar relationship between the two
belligerents that would also preserve intact Russian
interests in East Asia.68
The final guidelines which Witte received on July 11
reflected St. Petersburg's persistent conviction that Japan
had not won the war in Manchuria. His agenda opened with a
reaffirmation of Russian readiness to continue hostilities
should Japanese terms affront Russia's national honor. Next,
it enumerated the

conditions to which Russia would not

submit: cession of territory, payment of reparations,
disarmament of Vladivostok, future restriction of Russian
naval strength in the Pacific, and cession of the railway
line to Vladivostok. Although this report acknowledged
Russia's loss of control over Port Arthur, it stipulated
that Japanese acquisition of the harbor was to be subject to
China's approval, since Russia had originally leased it from
Beijing. The railway from Port Arthur was to be sold to
China. The official Russian position on Korea was
contradictory. Though it stated that Russia would recognize
Japanese supremacy in the peninsula, it demanded that Japan
recognize Korea's full independence and refrain from
bringing troops into Korea and fortifying the
Korean-Manchurian border.69
Although Witte concurred with these proposals, he
disagreed with the Tsar's belief in Russian ability to
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continue the war. Russia's urgent need for peace was soon
underscored in mid-July by a sobering report from Grand Duke
Nikolai Nikolaevich, who had recently presided over a somber
conference of Russia's military leaders. The Grand Duke
stated that Linievich's forces, with reinforcements, could
eventually drive Oyama's armies back to Port Arthur and the
Korean border. Unfortunately, it was estimated that such an
endeavor would require another year of hostilities, and
would cost Russia one billion rubles and as many as 500,000
casualties.70

Witte knew that wartime inflation had already

doubled the supply of rubles in circulation; prolongation of
the war therefore invited financial collapse.71

Though

Witte asserted to the Associated Press that Russia would not
seek peace at any price, such posturing was largely for the
sake of appearances. The Grand Duke's alarming assessment
reinforced Witte's determination to restore peace.72
At the same time, Russia's growing monetary instability
also impelled Witte to oppose paying reparations to Japan.
In mid-July of 1905, he travelled to Paris in search of
further French loans to Russia. He discovered that France
was willing to help Russia pay an indemnity to Japan, but
refused to finance a continuation of hostilities. Prime
Minister Maurice Rouvier advised that Russia needed peace,
even if Japan's terms included a demand for reparations. He
reminded Witte that the indemnity France had paid to Germany
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in 1871 had not tarnished French national dignity. Witte
retorted that Russia might reconsider its position on the
indemnity issue when the Japanese armies surrounded Moscow.
Anxious to learn Japan's terms, Witte then consulted Robert
McCormick, now the American ambassador to France. Likewise
uncertain of the nature of Japan's agenda, McCormick
mentioned an article in the North American Review which
predicted a Japanese demand for an indemnity. Witte warned
that, should Japan's envoys prove insistent upon this issue,
"(his) stay in the United States will be short."73
Such statements from Witte exacerbated Roosevelt's
fears that the conference would end in failure. In a letter
to Spring Rice on July 24, the President fumed about "the
monstrous ineptitude" of "the amorphous body which in Russia
stands as the Government," and opined that "Witte has talked
like a fool since he was appointed.1,74

Five days later, he

wrote to Whitelaw Reid, the American ambassador to Britain,
"...if the Russians play the fool to the extent that Witte's
published statements would imply, the Japs will have to go
on with the war and the Russians will thoroughly deserve the
additional disasters which they will encounter...If (the
Russians) persistently refuse to see any light, all we can
do is to shrug our shoulders and let them go on to their
fate."75

Ambassador Griscom in Tokyo received

Roosevelt's bleakest estimation on July 27: "Before you
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receive this, the peace negotiations I suppose will have
come to an end, and I rather think they will end in
failure.1,76
In response, the President redoubled his efforts to
persuade the Japanese to abandon the terms which jeopardized
the conference, but to little avail. The British government
remained aloof, maintaining that for London to urge
moderation upon Tokyo would break the spirit of the
Anglo-Japanese alliance. Frustrated, Roosevelt asked Spring
Rice why it was proper for France to urge peace upon Russia,
but improper for Britain to follow suit with Japan.
Privately, the President even began to wonder whether London
was encouraging Japanese ambitions.77

Further discussions

with Kaneko were equally fruitless. Unable to move his
former Harvard classmate, Roosevelt finally recommended that
Japan first obtain Russian agreement on the basic idea of
reparations without revealing an amount. If successful on
this point, the Japanese negotiators could then discuss the
size of the payment to be made.78
Shortly thereafter, an opportunity to urge flexibility
upon St. Petersburg emerged. To Russia's chagrin, Japan had
refused to agree to an armistice prior to the conference.
Consequently, the Tsar worried about a possible Japanese
seizure of Russian territory before negotiations began. On
July 7, his fears were realized as Japanese forces invaded
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Sakhalin Island. By the end of the month, the entire island
was under Japanese control.79

Foreign observers quickly

perceived that the possession of this Russian territory
greatly strengthened Japan's hand for the coming conference.
The New York Times correspondent in the Russian capital
commented, "the control of Sakhalin puts a powerful lever in
the possession of Japanese diplomacy, which finally has
something tangible in its hands to throw upon the scales
with the sword in the coming conference." In fact, he
asserted, "Japan has now in her hands enough trumps to take
the game."80
Attempting at the time to induce the Japanese to dilute
their peace terms, Roosevelt discerned in the fall of
Sakhalin an opportunity to soften the Russian position, as
well. Through Meyer, he bluntly told Lamsdorff that Russia
had no hope of victory, and that a reasonable indemnity and
cession of Sakhalin were small prices to pay for peace, in
comparison with what Japan would eventually demand if Russia
persisted. According to the President, Russian unwillingness
to admit defeat would result in the irretrievable loss of
Eastern Siberia.81

To Roosevelt's dismay, his warning

failed to induce St. Petersburg to muzzle Witte.
During these efforts to foster harmonious negotiations
between the belligerents, the President also prepared
Washington's official recognition of Japanese military
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supremacy in East Asia. Already, he had accepted Japan's
refusal to allow Chinese participation in the peace
conference.82

Specifically, however, Roosevelt's attention

focused upon Korea, under Japanese control since February of
1904. As early as June of 1904, he had accepted Japan's
domination of the peninsula as part of the postwar order.
The lack of American strength in the region, coupled with a
pro-Japanese trend in American public opinion (which he
shared), impelled his acquiescence. American possession of
the Philippines also imposed limitations on Washington's
East Asian policy. The destruction of Russia's Baltic Fleet
in May of 1905 established Japan as the primary naval power
in the western Pacific Ocean. Painfully aware of the
tenuousness of the American grasp on the Philippine
archipelago, Roosevelt sought to avoid confrontation between
the United States and Japan, and to direct the focus of
Japanese expansion toward the Asian continent (to the extent
dictated by his vision of the postwar balance of power
between Russia and Japan). In the summer of 1905, propaganda
from the few Americans who had supported Russia during the
war predicted eventual Japanese aggression against the
Philippine islands. Though he doubtless placed little
credence in such alarmism, Roosevelt nevertheless desired a
formal understanding with Japan which would clarify the
relationship between the empires of the two nations.83
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Accordingly, in late July of 1905, the Rough Rider sent
Secretary of War William Howard Taft on a confidential
mission to Tokyo to formalize a Japanese-American modus
vivendi. On July 27, Taft met with Prime Minister Katsura.
Following a lengthy discussion, the two statesmen drafted an
"agreed memorandum of conversation," in which the United
States recognized the Japanese protectorate over Korea and
Japan disavowed any designs on the Philippines. The
Taft-Katsura Agreement did not embody a quid pro quo
arrangement between the United States and Japan. Rather, it
expressed in writing an exchange of views in which Taft
reaffirmed American acceptance of Japanese suzerainty over
Korea, and Katsura dispelled the rhetoric of the pro-Russian
minority in the United States.84

Still, as historian John

Wilz has observed, the accord "put an American seal on the
death warrant of an independent Korea.1,85
As Taft and Katsura framed this agreement, the Japanese
peace delegation arrived in the United States. Komura and
his entourage had left the port city of Yokohama on July 8
amid great fanfare. With shouts of "Banzai!", over five
thousand Japanese citizens had gathered at the port to bid
farewell to the delegation that would end a glorious war
with an honorable peace. Komura sadly joked to one of his
subordinates, "When I return, these people will turn into
unruly mobs that will attack me with mud pies or pistols. So
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I had better enjoy their 'Banzai' now.”86

Arriving in New

York City in late July, Komura immediately consulted Kaneko.
The Foreign Minister confided that, though Tokyo had
advocated lenient terms, he would press the demands for an
indemnity and Sakhalin. Aware that his position would create
difficulties in the conference, Komura instructed Kaneko to
secure an arrangement with Roosevelt whereby the President
would intervene in the event of an impending rupture.87
Two days later, Komura and Takahira visited Roosevelt
at his summer home, Sagamore Hill, in Oyster Bay, Long
Island. The Foreign Minister gave the President a list of
Japan's peace terms which did not differentiate between
those which Tokyo had judged essential and optional. In
response, Roosevelt first recommended that Japan withdraw
its demands for the disarmament of Vladivostok and the
surrender of interned Russian warships. Then, he focused
once again on the indemnity issue. Informing Komura of
Witte's bold statements in Paris, Roosevelt said that he
would endeavor to soften Witte's position, but warned that
Japanese insistence upon this point could prove fatal to the
negotiations. Prolongation of hostilities might yield
further armed victories for Japan, but would not make the
obtainment of reparations any easier. After this meeting,
Komura concluded that Roosevelt wanted Japan to reduce its
demand for payment to "a very low sum.1* When the President

subsequently intimated to Kaneko that Russia might be
persuaded to pay a small amount of money if it was not
designated as an indemnity, Kaneko pointed out the Japanese
public's clamor for a large indemnity, and added that
Japan's postwar financial stability depended upon
reparations from Russia. In short, asserted Kaneko, a
sizable indemnity was "absolutely necessary."88
Roosevelt's fears that Witte would prove inflexible
were largely unfounded. His bombastic speeches in Paris
notwithstanding, Russia's chief negotiator recognized his
nation's need for peace. Though given strict guidelines by a
government that still refused to concede defeat, Witte was
privately willing to transcend his instructions in order to
end the catastrophic war. In fact, according to Rosen's
later recollection, Witte was prepared to surrender Sakhalin
and pay an indemnity, "provided it could be accomplished
under some plausible disguise" by the time he arrived in New
York City on August 2.89

Rosen himself, who had replaced

Cassini as the Russian ambassador to the United States in
early July, more closely represented the views of the Tsar.
Prior to Witte's arrival, Rosen visited Roosevelt at
Sagamore Hill, and "ventured to controvert the view the
President seemed to entertain as to the precarious character
of our position and the consequent necessity for us to
conclude peace at any sacrifice." He informed the President
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that two corps of Russia7s best troops, usually stationed in
the western part of the country, were then travelling
eastward to the war zone. Furthermore, he reminded the Rough
Rider, Oyama's forces had not advanced since their victory
at Mukden the previous March. These contentions, however,
failed to impress Roosevelt.90
Soon after Witte7s arrival in the United States, the
two Russian diplomats discussed Nicholas I I 7s prohibitions
against ceding territory and paying an indemnity. Since
Sakhalin was under Japanese control by that time, Witte and
Rosen concurred "that the presence of irremediable facts and
conditions" necessitated compromise on the first point.91
Initially, the two were divided over the indemnity question.
Whereas Witte favored a payment to Japan

to secure peace,

Rosen was not convinced that the success of the coming
conference depended upon Russian capitulation on this issue.
Rosen asserted his belief that Japan needed peace more
desperately than Russia. Indeed, he suspected that Tokyo had
secretly requested Roosevelt7s intercession.92

Lastly, the

two men at first differed on whether the time was ripe for
peace, in light of Russia7s domestic turmoil. Whereas Witte
held that immediate cessation of the war would ease
political tensions, Rosen contended that "the conclusion of
peace after a series of

defeats without our

a chance to redeem the glory of our arms

Army being given

by victory" would
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exacerbate the unrest.93

Both concluded, however, that this

last issue was academic, "as it concerned a question that
had already been settled by a higher power in a sense to
which our very presence at Portsmouth bore witness."94
Witte and Rosen soon reconciled their differing views
on the remaining points of contention, "which enabled (them)
to conduct the negotiations as if (they) had been one man
with one mind, one will, and one heart beating for (their)
country."95

During his first audience with Roosevelt on

August 4, Witte reiterated the official, hard-line Russian
position, vowing that, should Japan reject Russia's terms,
the Russian forces would "conduct a defensive war to the
last extreme, and we will see who will last the longest."
Alienated by Witte's brusque manner and dismayed by his
intransigence, Roosevelt later gloomily wrote to Senator
Lodge, "I do not think the Russians mean peace."96

On the

outcome of the approaching conference rested the fate of the
President's prestige and foreign policy objectives in East
Asia, as well as that of the combatants.
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CHAPTER III:

"THE BITTEREST DOSE JAPAN HAS EVER BEEN COMPELLED TO TAKE":

REACHING AN ILLUSORY PEACE AT PORTSMOUTH, 1905

On August 9, 1905, Komura and his colleagues drafted a
revised version of Japan's terms. Once again, Tokyo's
distinction between required and optional conditions was
discarded; instead, the proposals were listed in random
order. Following Roosevelt's advice, they deleted the word
"indemnity" from their terms, replacing it with a demand
that Russia reimburse Japan for "the actual expenses of the
war." Another sign of the President's influence was the
omission of the call for demilitarization of Vladivostok.
When Komura submitted the new list of demands to the
Russians during the first formal session on August 10, he
characterized it as "being shot through with the spirit of
compromise and moderation," reflecting the Japanese
Emperor's desire for an amicable peace. Witte and his
assistants did not agree. G. A. Planson, the Russian
mission's secretary, exclaimed that "the Japanese conditions
were more heavy than anything it was possible to expect."1
Subsequently, in a tense private meeting, the Russian
delegation formulated written replies to these demands.
Qualified approval was given to all but four of the terms.
For example, though the Russians acknowledged Japanese
primacy in Korea, they stipulated that Russian subjects
would enjoy the same rights as other foreigners in the
peninsula, that Japan would not impair the sovereignty of
the Korean Emperor, and that Japan would not fortify the
101
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Korean-Manchurian border.

(The evident contradiction between

the Japanese demand for control of Korea and the Russian
demand for the Korean Emperor's sovereign rights was not
addressed.) The four rejected terms were, predictably, the
demands for payment, Sakhalin, the surrender of interned
Russian warships, and the future limitation of Russian naval
strength in East Asia.2
The future status of Korea dominated the opening
negotiations, due to the Russian strictures. On August 12,
Komura developed a revised article which accommodated two of
the three Russian conditions. In return for Russian
recognition of Japanese supremacy in Korea, Japan would
guarantee the rights of Russian nationals residing there.
Also, the new proposal imposed mutual restrictions on
military fortifications on the Korean-Manchurian border.
Russia's attempt to uphold Korean sovereignty ignited fierce
debate. Eventually, the delegations adopted a compromise in
which the final treaty would not mention Korean sovereignty,
and the conference minutes and press releases would contain
Japanese pledges to consult Seoul before taking any future
measures that curtailed Korean sovereignty.3
The next area of concern was the disposition of
Manchuria. Komura proposed the simultaneous evacuation of
the region by the belligerent armies. He also required from
Russia a unilateral promise to uphold the Open Door policy
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in China. In contrast, Japanese withdrawal from the region
would be contingent upon Chinese ability to govern it. Witte
persuaded Komura to abandon Tokyo's prerequisite for
evacuation, but failed to induce the Japanese delegation to
reciprocate Russia's pledge on behalf of the Open Door.
Komura contended that Japan, unlike Russia, had done nothing
to create suspicion among the nations with interests in
China, and therefore did not share Russia's obligation to
formally disavow further designs there. According to him, a
joint pledge on behalf of the Open Door would be analogous
to a joint promise to a judge from a policeman and a burglar
that neither would steal again. Finally, Witte acceded to
this point.4
Both sides easily reached agreement on a mutual promise
to refrain from obstructing future foreign investments in
Manchuria. Subsequently, the delegations agreed on the
transfer to Japan of Russia's lease upon Port Arthur and
adjacent territory. The Russians sought to subject this
transfer to Chinese approval, since they had originally
leased the territory from Beijing. Though Komura admitted
that future negotiations between Beijing and Tokyo would be
necessary to confirm Japan's acquisition of the harbor and
its environs, he did not want the Russian transfer to depend
upon Chinese consent. In the end, Witte and Komura concurred
that the transfer would be "subject to the consent of the
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Chinese government," but that Beijing's approval would be
construed as a mere formality. Subsequent debate centered
upon the railway linking Port Arthur and Harbin. The two
sides eventually agreed that Japanese ownership of the
railway would extend northward from the harbor to the town
of Changchun (between Harbin and Mukden).5
Japan's struggle to wrest Sakhalin and reimbursement
from Russia dominated the remainder of the conference. On
August 15, Komura first broached the subject of Sakhalin,
which Japanese forces had seized the previous month. He
argued that the island was a geographical continuation of
the Japanese archipelago, and therefore was essential to
Japan's national security. When Witte mentioned the 1875
Russo-Japanese treaty by which Japan had relinquished claim
to Sakhalin in return for Russian recognition of Japan's
possession of the Kurile Islands, Komura retorted that Tokyo
had negotiated under duress. The Japanese people regarded
Russian occupation of the island as an act of aggression.
Witte countered that, after thirty years of Russian hegemony
over Sakhalin, the Russian people considered it Russian
territory. He also warned that Japan's refusal to evacuate
the island would perpetuate animosity between the two
countries. Two hours of debate failed to reduce the chasm
dividing the two negotiators, who finally decided to defer
the issue until a later session. Meanwhile, the revelation
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of Japanese peace terms steeled Tsarist resolve. On August
16, Nicholas II wrote to Lamsdorff, "On the loss of Sakhalin
there cannot be any talk. The Russian people would never
forgive me for giving any of our land to any enemy and my
own conscience would not allow it either." St. Petersburg
then ordered Witte to remain firm in denying the island to
Japan.6
Japan's demand for monetary compensation proved even
more contentious. On August 14, Roosevelt, still fearing
that the indemnity issue would endanger the conference, had
implored Kaneko to urge moderation upon his countrymen at
Portsmouth. Although the President did not counsel complete
abandonment of the demand for payment, he wanted Japan to
reduce the amount sought to a minimal level. Three days
later, in a particularly rancorous session, Komura and Witte
debated at length on this issue. Witte declared that only
nations unable to continue fighting paid indemnities to
their adversaries, and asserted that Russia was prepared to
continue hostilities. Only Japanese occupation of Moscow or
St. Petersburg would justify Tokyo's claim to reimbursement.
Exasperated, Komura admitted that Russia could continue
fighting, but asserted that Japan could do the same, adding
sarcastically, "In order to estimate how the war situation
will be in the future, you, plenipotentiary, know the
results of the past well enough to judge."7
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Eventually, the indemnity issue was also set aside, but
the verbal duel continued. Witte flatly rejected Japan's
demand for the Russian warships that had been interned in
neutral harbors, claiming that it violated international
law. He also balked at the Japanese demand for the future
limitation of Russian naval power in the Far East, but
assured Komura that the Russian navy needed to concentrate
its vessels in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, rather than
the Pacific Ocean. Finally, he vowed that the Russian
opposition to ceding territory and paying money was
unshakable, and suggested that the final session of the
conference be held on August 21. His Japanese counterpart
calmly accepted this implicit threat to break up the
negotiations without concluding a peace treaty.8
That evening (on August 17), in the privacy of their
hotel rooms, Witte and Komura warned their respective
governments of impending rupture, and urged that compromise
was necessary in order to prevent further bloodshed in
Manchuria. In his message to Lamsdorff, Witte speculated
that Japan would drop its demands for interned warships and
the future limitation of Russian naval strength in the Far
East. He advocated continued resistance on the indemnity
issue, calling it a matter of national honor. Then, he
strongly advised ceding Sakhalin to Japan. He pointed out
that Japan wielded de facto control over the island, and

107
contended that, even if Russia were to reclaim it, Japan
would still dominate the surrounding waters. Despite his
previous verbal altercation with Komura, Witte was convinced
that continuation of hostilities would be more disastrous
for Russia than an unpleasant peace settlement. Likewise,
Komura warned Tokyo of a possible failure of negotiations,
and outlined a tentative compromise plan. He informed
Katsura that he would withdraw the demands for interned
warships and future limitation of Russian naval power. He
would also ask Roosevelt to send a direct appeal to the
Tsar. Later that evening, Komura telegraphed Kaneko (who was
still in New York City) with instructions to seek the
President's help.9
This shared sense of urgency enabled the two
delegations to make concessions on the following day, August
18.

First, Komura gave Witte a statement declaring Japan's

readiness to abandon the terms concerning interned vessels
and Russian naval power, provided the Russians were willing
to discuss Sakhalin and the indemnity. In response, Witte
presented a compromise plan in which Russia would obtain the
northern half of Sakhalin, and Japan would keep the southern
half. He reiterated that St. Petersburg would never pay war
reparations beyond the expenses of caring for prisoners of
war. Lastly, he warned that, although he personally wished
for peace, martial passions were reviving throughout Russia.
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Komura replied that the Japanese public expected a generous
peace settlement to conclude a victorious war. He then
attempted to incorporate the indemnity demand into Witte's
proposal, suggesting that Japan would retrocede the northern
half of Sakhalin in return for a payment of 1.2 billion yen
(which Tokyo had calculated to be the sum of Japan's wartime
expenses). Witte countered that the Tsar would never accept
such a thinly disguised indemnity, and that Japan could
never hope to obtain such a large sum from Russia. At
Komura's prodding, however, both delegations included the
monetary amount in their reports of the compromise plan to
their respective governments. Finally, both sides agreed to
postpone the next session until the following Tuesday,
August 22, in order to give their governments time to
respond to the compromise proposal.10
Three days later, on August 21, Komura and Witte
received their governments' answers. Tokyo approved of the
compromise plan, and authorized Komura to reduce the price
for northern Sakhalin if necessary. In contrast, the Tsar
said "nyet," arguing that "in essence the Japanese are
rearranging their demands." A subsequent note from S t .
Petersburg ordered Witte to dissolve the conference if the
Japanese failed to retreat from their "excessive demands."
Undeterred, Witte cabled several appeals to the Russian
capital for the surrender of Sakhalin. He warned that,
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although world opinion would support the refusal to grant an
indemnity, it would not countenance the refusal to cede
Sakhalin. If Russia resisted both terms, the world community
would blame it for the continuation of hostilities.11
The same day, August 21, the Japanese delegation,
through Kaneko, sought Roosevelt's intervention. Conferring
with his former Harvard classmate, the President learned of
the Witte-Komura compromise plan and of Tokyo's acceptance
of it. He recommended to Kaneko that Japan halve the
demanded sum to 600 million yen, and seek an additional 150
million yen to compensate for the care of Russian prisoners
of war. Later that day, responding to the Japanese request,
Roosevelt drafted his appeal to Nicholas II. He urged the
Russian monarch to accept "in principle" the retrocession of
northern Sakhalin in return for payment to Japan. The
specific sum would be negotiated subsequent to the
restoration of peace. In conclusion, Roosevelt once again
warned of the dire consequences to Russia if the war were to
resume, predicting that Japan would conquer eastern Siberia.
The President sent copies of this appeal to Paris and
Berlin, seeking their assistance and assuring them that he
would advise the Japanese to choose peace regardless of the
size of payment obtained.12
Still hoping to soften the Japanese position on the
indemnity issue, Roosevelt again tried to influence Kaneko
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over the next several days, contending that Japan had
already achieved its basic war aims. On August 22, he
relayed to Kaneko a telegram which he had received from
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge the day before. Echoing the
President's sentiments, Lodge had written that "it is the
height of folly to continue that war...If (Japan) renews the
fighting merely to get money, she will not get the money,
and she will turn sympathy from her in this country and
elsewhere very rapidly."13

Asserting that it was Japan's

"ethical duty" to cease hostilities, Roosevelt reminded
Kaneko of the considerable gains Japan had achieved: "She
has won the control of Korea and Manchuria; she has doubled
her own fleet in destroying that of Russia; she has Port
Arthur, Dalny, the Manchurian railroad, she has Sakhalin."
Resumption of warfare to obtain the indemnity would "not be
worth (Japan's) while, when so to continue it would probably
eat up more money than she could at the end get back from
Russia." He implored the Japanese to "show (their)
leadership in matters ethical no less than in matters
military" by deciding for peace.14

The President also

invoked American history in the attempt to convince Kaneko
that land was a better prize for victory than money. He
cited the successful American wars against Mexico and Spain;
on both occasions, the United States had paid its vanquished
foe for territory won in battle. Finally, Roosevelt argued
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that further Japanese conquests in Manchuria would fail to
win compliance from Russia, and asserted that, if he were in
Komura's place, he would abandon the indemnity demand.15
In response, Kaneko informed the President of Komura's
willingness to reduce substantially the amount sought by
Japan. Despite his previous militance, the Foreign Minister
now would be satisfied with a sum ranging from 600 to 800
million yen.16

In addition, Kaneko again upheld the

correctness of Japan's quest for payment. Referring to
Lodge's letter, Kaneko asked Roosevelt to dispel the
Senator's misconceptions:

Our Government is not demanding the indemnity
beside keeping the whole island of Sakhalin. We
have, as you know, surrendered a half of the
island, for which we demand a payment - not
indemnity - this is perfectly reasonable and
just on our part.17

Unfortunately, Kaneko's emphasis on this distinction soon
lost credibility. During the afternoon session on August 23,
Witte wrested from Komura an admission that the payment
sought for northern Sakhalin was actually the demand for
indemnity in disguised form. In another deft maneuver, Witte
queried whether Japan would accept the whole of Sakhalin
without payment. Komura's refusal of this offer placed Japan
in the position of continuing the war for money.18

112
As the deadlock on the reparations issue deepened in
Portsmouth, Roosevelt anxiously awaited the results of his
appeal to Tsar Nicholas II. On August 23, Meyer presented
the President's plea to the Russian monarch. Initially, the
Tsar remained stubborn, quoting from a letter that he had
just written to Wilhelm II in which he had vowed not to cede
territory or pay money. He reminded Meyer that the Japanese
army was thousands of miles from Moscow and St. Petersburg,
and that it had not advanced since its victory at Mukden the
previous March. The Witte-Komura compromise proposal was
unacceptable, argued Nicholas II, since the division of
Sakhalin would perpetuate tensions between the two nations.
Meyer countered that Sakhalin was not part of Russia proper,
pointing out that Russia's claim to the island only dated
back to the Russo-Japanese treaty of 1875. This contention
brought results. At last, the Russian monarch agreed to cede
the southern half of Sakhalin. When pressed for a pledge to
pay for the northern half, however, the Tsar adamantly
refused. He would amply reimburse Japan for its care of
Russian prisoners of war, but would never agree to a payment
that could be construed as a war indemnity. Still, having
relented on the Sakhalin issue, the Tsar indicated to Meyer
that he would not enforce his earlier injunction to Witte to
break up the conference. The next day, August 24, Lamsdorff
informed Witte of the Tsar's decision to cede southern
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Sakhalin without payment, calling it Russia's "final
proposal." Subsequent appeals from Roosevelt to the Tsar and
Witte to accept payment "in principle," with the amount to
be determined by subsequent negotiations, met with flat
rejections.19
On August 26, Witte informed Komura of the Tsar's
concession, warning that the Russian delegation would not
make further offers. He reminded Komura of the resurgence of
pro-war sentiment in Russia, and of Linievich's readiness to
launch a counteroffensive in Manchuria. Prolongation of
negotiations would not soften the Russian terms. Taken
aback, Japan's Foreign Minister requested postponement of
the concluding session until Monday, August 28, pending
final instructions from Tokyo. Perhaps venting his growing
frustration toward Russian rigidity on the indemnity issue,
Komura cabled Tokyo that evening with news of Russia's
refusal to abandon its position on both key issues of
Sakhalin and reparations. He then informed his government of
his decision to break off negotiations with Witte. From his
communications, Tokyo did not learn of the Tsar's decision
to cede southern Sakhalin.20
Komura's bombshell arrived in Tokyo at a time in which
the Japanese government was reluctantly considering further
diminution of the amount of monetary compensation sought
from Russia. Kaneko had relayed Roosevelt's messages on the
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indemnity question to Tokyo. The President's advice was a
bitter pill for Japan's leaders, who were only too aware of
the burgeoning demands of the Japanese public for a huge
payment from Russia. They had, however, decided that Japan's
need for peace outweighed its need for war reparations, and
were in the process of drafting new instructions for the
delegation which authorized it to further reduce the
demanded sum when Komura's telegram arrived. Stung into
action, Katsura ordered his Foreign Minister to postpone the
last session until August 29, to allow time for the Japanese
government to formulate final instructions. Several of
Japan's leaders then framed revised orders for Komura.
Influenced by Navy Minister Yamamoto Gonnohyoe, these
instructions called for retention of Sakhalin, but
abandonment of the claim for an indemnity. After a lengthy
debate on this proposal, the Genro and the cabinet members
diluted it still further. Komura was now to withdraw both
controversial demands in order to secure peace.21
Meanwhile, both delegations in Portsmouth were
preparing for imminent departure. Witte agreed to the
Japanese request to defer the final session until August 29,
but asserted that the passage of extra time would not change
the final Russian offer.22

In Oyster Bay, a disheartened

President, unaware of Tokyo's increasing desperation, was
prepared to concede defeat. He blamed the Russians for the
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impasse. On August 25, Roosevelt wrote to his son Kermit, "I
am having my hair turned gray by dealing with the Russian
and Japanese peace negotiators. The Japanese ask too much,
but the Russians are ten times worse than the Japs because
they are so stupid and won't tell the truth."23

Messages

from Portsmouth predicting failure deepened Roosevelt's
pessimism. Finally, in a memorandum to Kaneko's secretary,
the Rough Rider expressed his resignation on August 27:

Tell (Kaneko) that the President has striven to
prepare the Associated Press for the break,
explaining to them that it is Russia's fault, but
that unless he hears something new,...he will not
try to do anything further in the matter. It seems
to him useless for him to add another word to
what he has said to the Tsar.24

The tension was soon broken. On the afternoon of August
28, Komura, who had been willing to bring the conference to
the brink of dissolution over the issues of Sakhalin and war
reparations, received the new orders from Tokyo. The
Japanese government's retreat on both issues shocked its
delegation. Thunderstruck, Komura's private secretary, Honda
Kumataro, loudly denounced his government's decision: "What
a shameful thing it is!"25

The stoic Foreign Minister

vainly strove to bolster the spirits of his crestfallen
colleagues while preparing for the next day's session.
Momentous developments in Tokyo soon brought some cheer
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to the Japanese negotiators. Shortly after the Japanese
government cabled its orders to Komura, British ambassador
Sir Claude MacDonald summoned Ishii Kikujiro, then the head
of the commercial bureau of the foreign ministry. Through
MacDonald, Ishii learned of the Tsar's August 23 decision to
cede southern Sakhalin to Japan. Meyer had informed the
British embassy in St. Petersburg of his audience with the
Russian monarch, and it was standard practice for the
British Foreign Office to relay important information to
other posts.26

Regarding this revelation to be "an act of

Providence,"27

Ishii quickly informed Katsura. The Prime

Minister rapidly obtained consent from the cabinet, Genro,
and Emperor to dispatch revised instructions to Komura, in
which he was to demand the southern half of the contested
island without payment for the northern portion.28

Tokyo

rushed its new instructions to Portsmouth. Still somewhat
chagrined by the Japanese government's compromise on the two
troublesome issues, the Foreign Minister received the
revised orders, muttering, "This is what I thought they
would tell me."29
Meanwhile, Witte received another message from
Lamsdorff. The Tsar now ordered his delegation to dissolve
the conference on the next day, regardless of any further
developments in the negotiations. Defiantly, Nicholas II
concluded, "I prefer to continue the war than to await
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gracious concessions on the part of Japan." Rosen favored
obeying the Russian monarch. Witte, on the other hand,
decided that, on August 29, he would instead repeat his
August 18 offer to cede southern Sakhalin to Japan, without
reparations. This way, if Komura refused this condition, the
blame for the resulting failure of the conference would fall
upon Japan, rather than Russia.30
The next morning's session began with a private meeting
between the four plenipotentiaries, in which the two sides
informally agreed to the division of Sakhalin and the
withdrawal of the indemnity demand. Shortly afterward,
Komura and Witte made the compromise official during the
formal negotiating session. They specified that the island
would be partitioned along the fiftieth parallel, and
concurred on a mutual prohibition against military
installations there. Both nations would honor freedom of
navigation in the Strait of La Perouse (south of the island)
and in the Strait of Tartary (between the island and the
mainland) .31
Soon afterward, Witte's personal secretary, Ivan
Korostovetz, telephoned the reporters at the hotel to give
them the good news that peace was assured. During a break in
the session, Witte triumphantly cabled St. Petersburg with
the report that "Japan has accepted our demands concerning
peace conditions...Russia will remain a great power in the
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Far East, the same great power she was until now and which
she will always remain." He also sent a congratulatory note
to Roosevelt: "To you History will award the glory of having
taken the generous initiative in bringing about the
conference, whose labors will now probably result in
establishing a peace honorable to both sides."32

Though he

did not share his counterpart's exuberance, Komura likewise
notified Tokyo and expressed gratitude to the President: "I
beg to thank you again, Mr. President, for all you have done
in the interest of peace...Owing to your earnest and
unceasing efforts and the magnanimity of His Majesty the
Emperor of Japan, peace, in the interest of humanity and
civilization, is assured."33

Roosevelt replied with a

telegram praising Japan for its "wisdom and magnanimity... in
its hour of triumph."34
The divisive issues finally resolved, the two
delegations then addressed several residual points over the
next several days. After receiving authorization from their
respective governments, Komura and Witte signed an armistice
protocol and established an eighteen-month time limit for
the military evacuation of Manchuria. The negotiators then
agreed that their nations would exchange prisoners of war
and reimburse each other for the costs of caring for them.
Since Japan had spent much more than Russia in this area,
Russia would pay Japan the difference between the two
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amounts. They committed their nations to a future revision
of the existing Russo-Japanese commercial treaty. Russia and
Japan would also discuss connecting their Manchurian
railways once peace was restored.35
The Portsmouth Conference came to a close with the
signing of the peace treaty on the afternoon of Tuesday,
September 5, 1905.36

The ordeal reinforced American

admiration of Japan and contempt for Russia. The American
press hailed Japan's willingness to sacrifice in the name of
peace as "a most impressive lesson in moderation,
self-restraint, and consummate world statesmanship.1,37
Writing to William Rockhill, the American ambassador to
China, on August 29, Roosevelt stated, "I was pro-Japanese
before, but after my experience with the peace
commissioners, I am far stronger pro-Japanese than ever."38
In Roosevelt's view, Japan's final decision to compromise
derived as much from the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance on August 1239

as from the prudence of its

leaders. He surmised that the renewed alliance allayed
Japanese fears of future Russian aggression. To Sir Henry
Mortimer Durand, the British ambassador in Washington, the
President wrote on September 4, "I have no doubt that the
signing of the treaty between England and Japan was a
powerful factor in inducing Japan to be wise and reasonable
as to terms."40
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Japanese public reaction to the Portsmouth Treaty
sorely tested this laudatory perception of the Asian island
nation. Nationalistic newspapers in Japan, which had
heightened their readers' expectations of a generous peace
settlement, began to blast the government as rumors of its
concessions emerged. Still unaware of the actual military
situation in Manchuria, firebrands in the Japanese press
argued that the peace settlement failed to achieve the
primary objective of eliminating the Russian threat in Korea
and Manchuria, and urged the Emperor to reject the coming
treaty. A scathing article in the Yorozo Choho on September
1 accused Komura of betraying Japan:

The glory of our Imperial nation, demonstrated to
all the world by our military triumphs, has been
completely erased by none other than our
plenipotentiary. It is (he) who has smeared the
face of the ever-victorious nation. It is (he)
who has acted miserably on the international
stage and put himself to shame. On the day of
his return, he should be met with flags of mourning.
Every person in the city (of Tokyo) should shut
the door of his house and turn away from him. Any
who welcome this soft fellow, who has invited
unprecedented humiliation upon our nation, are
wretched people with no blood, no public mind,
no sense of righteousness.41

Other Japanese newspapers condemned the treaty as "an insult
to the nation" and "the bitterest dose the nation has ever
been compelled to take."42

Very few Tokyo newspapers, such
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as the government-owned Kokumin Shimbun, supported the peace
settlement, attempting to convince their readers that Japan
had abandoned only its secondary war aims, and that further
prosecution of hostilities would exact a ruinous cost from
the Japanese nation.43
Such counsel fell upon deaf ears, as Japanese citizens
explosively expressed their outrage. Ominously, the upheaval
in the Japanese capital soon assumed an anti-American tone.
Protestors mutilated photographs of Roosevelt,44

and

informed the American embassy of an impending visit, in
order to "express appreciation for the part the President
had played in depriving Japan of the fruits of war."45

On

the evening of September 5, American ambassador Lloyd
Griscom and railroad magnate Edward H. Harriman attended a
dinner party given by Japan's Finance Minister, Baron Sone
Arasuke. Japanese crowds stoned two members of the American
embassy as they travelled to Sone's residence. The next day,
September 6, the Japanese government placed Tokyo under
martial law in order to restore order.46

More than one

thousand people were either killed or wounded as a result of
the unrest that convulsed Japan.47
Reporting the upheaval to Secretary of State Elihu Root
on September 15, Griscom emphasized his conviction that the
threats to the foreign community in Japan were merely
incidental to the general rioting. He asserted that the
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stage was set for the popular explosion when "ambitious
politicians and sensational newspapers combined to inflame
the imagination of the masses and raise to impossible
heights their expectations as to what would be the fruits of
victory."48

He blamed the secretiveness of the Japanese

government, which prevented "calm discussion of the logical
results of the war."49

Interestingly, after explaining the

Japanese outburst to Washington, Griscom then suggested that
it offered an important case study of the nation's true
character:

The riots have had particular interest to the world
at large, for not only have foreigners been to some
extent concerned, but they have had an opportunity
of studying the political and social institutions of
Japan under the strain of trying times. It is only
in such crises as these that the veil of Oriental
inscrutability is momentarily lifted and the foreign
observer enabled to gain a brief glimpse of the
operation of the Japanese mental process and the
well-spring of their emotions.50

Similarly, the New York Times ascribed the unrest to
Tokyo's wartime unwillingness to divulge accurate
information to its citizens, but also interpreted the chaos
as a blot upon the Japanese character. The explosive
response to the Portsmouth Treaty, it was argued,
demonstrated conclusively that the modernization of Japan
had been a superficial phenomenon, leaving unchanged its
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basic, primitive nature. A September 8 editorial

discussing

"the grave news from Tokyo" averred,

...it is the (Japanese) Government's fault that (its)
people do not see and agree that peace on the terms
concluded and at the time concluded was wise, best,
and just for Japan...(The rioting) is an astonishing
"reversal of form" for Japan...It warns us that,
rapid and astonishing as has been her advance in
civilization during the past thirty years, and great
as has been her eagerness to adopt the Western ways,
she is still far from being wholly regenerate.51

To make matters worse, the editorial continued, Tokyo's
failure to inform its citizenry of Japan's actual military
and diplomatic position encouraged misunderstanding which
jeopardized the future of Japanese-American amity:

The evil consequences of (Tokyo's) stubborn refusal
to recognize American impartiality may persist to
trouble our relations with Japan for years...The
inner Government circle in Tokyo, we may be sure, is
well aware that Mr. Roosevelt's good offices were in
a very high degree saving and beneficent for the
empire...His Imperial Majesty's Government owes it
first of all to itself, as a measure of prudence and
safety, and nearly as much to us in common fairness,
to make it known everywhere throughout the land that
Mr. Roosevelt in his intercession conducted himself,
not as the friend of either belligerent alone, but as
the friend of both and of humanity,...desiring only
that for the sake both of Russia and Japan there
should be concluded a "just and lasting peace."52

Roosevelt also blamed Tokyo for Japan's discontent, and
viewed the Japanese behavior as a vindication of his
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peacemaking efforts and his vision of the postwar balance of
power in East Asia. To his friend Hermann Speck von
Sternburg, the German ambassador to the United States, the
President expressed his chagrin toward the Japanese
government on September 6:

Why in the world the Japanese statesmen, usually so
astute, permitted their people to think they had to
get a large indemnity, I cannot Understand. If they
had in the beginning blown their trumpets over the
immense amount they were getting; if they had shown
how Korea was theirs, Manchuria in effect theirs,
Port Arthur and Dalny theirs; how they had won a
triumph which since the days of Napoleon has only
been paralleled by Germany in 1870 - if they had
done all this, I think they could have made their
people feel proud instead of humiliated.53

As a postscript to a letter written to Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge on the same day, Roosevelt commented that the unrest
in Tokyo was "unpleasant evidence that the Japanese mob - I
hope not the Japanese people - has had its head completely
turned," and added that "the peace is evidently a wise one
from our standpoint, too."54

Two days later, the President

briefly elaborated this final point in another note to
Lodge. Claiming that the riots "showed that the (Japanese)
people have not advanced as far as their Government," he
asserted that "it is a good thing for mankind that the war
should have ended as it did, without the Japanese getting an
enormous indemnity and with them still facing Russia in East
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Asia."55
Perhaps responding to the domestic hostility faced by
Japan's leaders in the aftermath of the conference,
Roosevelt decided to maintain the secrecy of Tokyo's initial
requests for American mediation from the spring of 1905.
Although aware of growing Japanese suspicions of American
complicity in the framing of the unwelcome peace, the
President chose not to reveal the information that likely
would have further incriminated Japan's embattled leaders in
their compatriots' eyes.56

Roosevelt's decision to maintain

the confidentiality of his pre-conference correspondence
with Tokyo despite the anti-American tinge to the Japanese
outburst attests to the tactfulness with which he dealt with
Japan's leaders. Unfortunately, suspicions of American
duplicity lingered among many of Japan's citizens long after
the immediate reactions to the treaty subsided. This
undercurrent of tension would color Japanese-American
relations as competition between the two nations for
influence in East Asia sharpened through the years
subsequent to the Portsmouth Conference.
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CONCLUSION:

CASUALTY OF WAR:

ECLIPSE OF THE "OPEN DOOR" AFTER 1905

The meteoric rise of Japan as a significant participant
in the world arena, as occasioned by the Russo-Japanese War
of 1904-05, challenged the complacent assumptions of
American leaders regarding their ability to shape events in
East Asia. Between 1899 and 1904, Washington had perceived
the nations of Europe as the greatest threat to the American
vision of an inviolate China wholly open to international
commerce. Painfully aware of their inability to defend their
Asian interests with armed force, American leaders had
viewed with dismay the European dissection of northeastern
China in the late 1890s. Nevertheless, since the military
power of the Western European nations was widely dispersed
I

among their far-flung imperial possessions, Washington
confidently believed that words alone would suffice to
maintain conditions in East Asia conducive to American
interests. The Russian occupation of Manchuria after the
Boxer Rebellion dealt the first serious blow to this
assumption. Unable to counteract the Russian aggression,
American leaders eventually hailed Japan's bold stroke in
1904, hoping that Japanese objectives on the Asian continent
coincided with their own. However, Japan's armed
accomplishments during the war with Russia portended a new,
much greater challenge to the American goals enumerated in
the "Open Door" notes of 1899 and 1900. By the summer of
1905, American leaders faced a nation which had achieved
132
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primacy in East Asia. Unencumbered by a territorially
expansive empire, Japan could afford to concentrate all of
its formidable armed strength in that region, thereby posing
a potential threat of unmatched gravity to the "Open Door."
To a significant extent, this threat motivated Theodore
Roosevelt to convene a peace conference between the
belligerents in the summer of 1905. Unaware of the exhausted
/

condition of the Japanese forces in Manchuria after their
hard-won victory at Mukden, the President believed that a
continuation of hostilities would result in the complete
Japanese domination of Manchuria and possibly Siberia. He
therefore sought to restore peace before Japan eliminated
the Russian presence in East Asia. In his vision of the
postwar balance of power in Asia, each former belligerent
would check the other's expansionistic impulses, thereby
upholding the "Open Door" principle. At the same time,
Roosevelt recognized that Japan's postwar primacy in the
region necessitated revision of John Hay's precepts.
Japanese control of Korea and southern Manchuria at war's
end, which Roosevelt supported, forced Washington to relax
the commitment to Chinese territorial integrity which it had
assumed with the second "Open Door" note. From Washington's
point of view, then, the peace of Portsmouth represented an
attempt to create a compromise between American and Japanese
objectives in East Asia.
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For his mediation efforts, Roosevelt won accolades from
other world leaders and from his fellow Americans. In 1906,
he became the first American president to receive the Nobel
Peace Prize.1

Unfortunately, Roosevelt's attempt to

reconcile the "Open Door" principle with Japanese
expansionism proved short-lived. Even before the decade
ended, Japan and the United States had embarked upon a
fateful competition for influence in East Asia which
undermined the President's conception of the postwar balance
of power and set the two nations upon a fateful collision
course.
Some Americans began to sound the alarm while the
Portsmouth Conference was still in progress. On August 18,
1905, a New York Times editorial entitled "The Coming
Struggle with Japan" predicted that Japanese business would
dominate East Asia as effectively as had Japanese arms. Gone
was the belief that Japan's war effort had served American
interests: "...we perceive that the actuating motives of
Japan and of Russia in their struggle for dominion in the
East were substantially identical...We furthermore perceive
that whichever was victorious, we were bound to be the
losers."2

Instead, the Russo-Japanese War heralded an era

in which Japan would undersell, and thus eclipse, all
foreign competition in East Asia:
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.. .We shall grievously mistake (the Japanese) if
we suppose they will be less efficient in the arts
of peace than they have been in the arts of war...If
it be true that price makes the market, another
terrible taking down awaits the Western world's
vanity, and this time its pockets will come into
the reckoning. If there be a yellow peril,
undoubtedly it is a commercial one.3

Events soon substantiated this grim prognosis for the
"Open Door" in the territory that had fallen into the
Japanese orbit. In August of 1905, the American railroad
magnate Edward H. Harriman had travelled to Tokyo in the
hopes of cultivating a Japanese-American partnership for the
development of southern Manchuria. Specifically, he sought a
joint endeavor to rebuild and expand the region's railways
in order to advance his own dream of a transportation system
that would improve international commerce by
circumnavigating the world. By the time Harriman left Tokyo
on October 16, 1905, he had secured an agreement that would
have joined American investors with the Japanese government
in the expansion and operation of the railways in southern
Manchuria. On the same day, Komura returned to the Japanese
capital from his sojourn in the United States. Aghast at
this proposal, the Foreign Minister promptly vetoed it. In
large part, his opposition derived from the fear that
sharing Japan's limited gains with the United States would
fan the flames of popular discontent at home. In the spring
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of 1906, the American banker Jacob Schiff, who had
spearheaded American loans to wartime Japan, attempted to
resurrect Harriman's scheme, but without success.4
Meanwhile, Komura strove to enhance the Japanese
position in Manchuria through negotiations with Chinese
leaders. In mid-November of 1905, he travelled to Beijing in
order to obtain China's official approval of the Portsmouth
Treaty clauses which granted to Japan the former Russian
leaseholds on Port Arthur and the railway linking it to
Changchun to the north. He also sought Chinese concurrence
with confidential proposals designed to increase Japanese
control over the development of railways and international
commerce in Manchuria. Komura's visit to the Chinese capital
coincided with the Qing government's belated efforts to
enact political reforms and to centralize its control over
Chinese territory. As part of their reformist drive, Chinese
leaders resolved to limit the foreign inroads into their
nation's territory, and to regain control over the network
of foreign-owned railroads which increasingly dominated its
economy.5

The Chinese plenipotentiaries who met Komura and

Uchida Yasuya (Japan's ambassador to Beijing) in November of
1905 struggled to defend this growing national consciousness
against Japanese expansionism. Among the Chinese
representatives was Yuan Shikai, who had covertly provided
the Japanese armies with supplies and military information
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obtained through espionage, believing that Japan would
champion Chinese nationhood in return.6
The Beijing Conference dashed Yuan's hopes. Komura
abruptly dismissed as "inconsequential matters" Chinese
proposals for joint control of Port Arthur and recognition
of Chinese sovereignty in southern Manchuria. Further, he
contended that the military occupation of southern Manchuria
conferred upon Japan the right to deny other nations access
to the region. Invoking the possible threat of a Russian war
of revenge, Komura also pressured the Chinese to allow Japan
to construct railways that would penetrate northward toward
Siberia. By the Sino-Japanese accords signed on December 22,
1905, Komura laid the foundations for Japan's economic
domination of Manchuria. He extracted a Chinese pledge not
to construct railways that would threaten Japanese economic
interests in Manchuria. Finally, Japan would exercise
considerable influence in the opening of Manchurian towns to
international trade.7

Several subordinate Japanese

diplomats perceived the potential force of Chinese
nationalism, and advised Tokyo that Japan should cultivate
Chinese friendship by refraining from such exploitation.
Komura, however, strongly believed that "Japan should
doggedly push forward toward its imperial destiny, no matter
how much the forces of nationalism were giving the fruits of
victory a sour taste."8

Through the postwar era, the
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Foreign Minister's views would prevail.
The American consul in Mukden, Willard Straight,
attempted in 1907 to stem this trend by proposing a
Manchurian bank, financed by Edward H. Harriman, to
subsidize Chinese administration of Manchuria.
Unfortunately, the financial panic of that year prevented
implementation of his idea.9

Official American policy soon

recognized that such schemes had no place in a region that
had fallen into the Japanese orbit. The Roosevelt
administration initiated Washington's pragmatic acceptance
of Japan's continental foothold in the aftermath of the
Russo-Japanese War. It had officially recognized Japanese
suzerainty over Korea with the Taft-Katsura Agreement signed
in July of 1905. In October of 1908, Tokyo instructed
Takahira to reach another formal understanding with
Secretary of State Elihu Root regarding Japanese and
American spheres of influence in East Asia and the Pacific.
The Root-Takahira Agreement, signed on November 30, 1908,
invoked the "Open Door" policy for China and proclaimed the
Pacific Ocean to be an open avenue of trade. However, the
agreement embodied Roosevelt's pragmatic retreat from the
original intent of the "Open Door" notes by accepting
Japanese hegemony over southern Manchuria. A disgruntled
Willard Straight condemned the agreement as "a terrible
diplomatic blunder" which signalled American abandonment of
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China to Japanese designs.10

Nonetheless, leaders in

Washington and Tokyo praised it as a gesture which would lay
the foundations for subsequent Japanese-American harmony.
Unfortunately, the coexistence which the Root-Takahira
Agreement apparently heralded proved short-lived. Attempts
by the United States to enhance its position in postwar East
Asia (such as Harriman's Manchurian railway venture)
hastened rapprochement between the two former belligerents,
which shared a common desire to minimize the American
economic and political penetration of China. As a result,
Theodore Roosevelt's vision of the postwar balance of power
in East Asia began to break down even before he left the
presidency. On July 25, 1907, after concluding a new
commercial treaty, Russia and Japan signed two agreements
regarding their positions on the Asian continent. Only one,
which reaffirmed the Portsmouth Treaty and declared the
signatories' support for the "Open Door" in China, was
publicized. The secret accord delineated their spheres of
interest in Manchuria and recognized Russia's special
interests in Outer Mongolia as well as Japan's domination of
Korea. Subsequently, on July 4, 1910, Tokyo and St.
Petersburg concluded another entente which again contained
publicized and confidential clauses. Notably, the public
portion omitted any obligation to support the "Open Door"
and Chinese territorial integrity. Instead, it committed the

140
signatories to agree upon measures in the event of external
threats to the status quo in Manchuria. The secret portion
reaffirmed the line of demarcation separating their
Manchurian domains and pledged Russia and Japan to common
action in defense of them.11
Besides threatening American policy objectives in
China, this Russo-Japanese rapprochement in the years
immediately following the Portsmouth Conference also
intensified the potential Japanese menace to American
possessions in the western Pacific Ocean. Having restored
amity with its erstwhile adversary, Japan could then
contemplate expansion into other regions. Weakly defended
American insular territories in the Pacific, particularly
the Philippines, presented easy targets for a renewed
Japanese thrust. At an early stage of the Russo-Japanese
War, Washington read the Russian plight as a case study of
the fatal consequences of imperialism without concomitant
military strength. Theodore Roosevelt and his colleagues
fervently hoped that the American people would awaken from
their ingrained sense of isolation from the rest of the
world and support an expansion of their nation's armed
forces in order to defend its claim to the status of a world
power. Writing to the President on February 15, 1904, former
Secretary of War (and future Secretary of State) Elihu Root
praised Admiral Togo Heihachiro's initial strike against
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Port Arthur, and then added hopefully, "some people in the
United States might well learn the lesson that mere bigness
does not take the place of perfect preparation and readiness
for instant action."12

Replying to Root the next day,

Roosevelt concurred, lamenting, "oh, if only our people
would learn the need of preparedness, and of shaping things
so that decision and action alike can be instantaneous. Mere
bigness, if it is also mere flabbiness, means nothing but
disgrace. "13
On June 11, 1904, the President expressed to Takahira
and Kaneko his growing misgivings regarding Japan's military
prowess. Later describing this meeting in a letter to Cecil
Arthur Spring Rice, Roosevelt recalled,

I told them that I thought their chief danger was
lest Japan might get the "big head" and enter into a
general career of insolence and aggression; that
such a career would undoubtedly be temporarily
very unpleasant to the rest of the world, but that
it would in the end be still more unpleasant for
Japan. I added that though I felt there was a
possibility of this happening, I did not think it
probable, because I was a firm believer in the
Japanese people.14

As a postscript to this letter, Roosevelt commented, "I am
perfectly well aware that if they win out (against Russia),
it may possibly mean a struggle between them and us in the
future; but I hope not and believe not."15
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The enormity of Japan's subsequent armed triumphs
exacerbated the President's fears of American weakness in
the Pacific. Writing to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge on June 5,
1905, Roosevelt averred, "Most certainly the Japanese have
shown themselves to be terrible foes. There can be none more
dangerous in all the world." He then emphasized that the
future of the American insular empire depended not only upon
amicable relations with Japan, but also upon increased
military power. Characterizing Japan as "a power jealous,
sensitive, and warlike, which, if irritated, could at once
take both the Philippines and Hawaii from us," the President
concluded with an expression of hope that "we can persuade
our people...to act in the spirit of generous justice and
genuine courtesy toward Japan, and to keep the (American)
navy respectable in numbers and more than respectable in the
efficiency of its units. If we act thus, we need not fear
the Japanese. But if, as Brooks Adams says, we show
ourselves 'opulent, aggressive, and unarmed,' the Japanese
may some time work us an injury."16
Personnel in the American armed forces soon echoed
Roosevelt's alarm. In late 1905, an American army officer
named Homer Lea began work on a remarkable book that was
finally published in 1909. Lea had witnessed Japanese
soldiers in action during the suppression of the Boxer
Rebellion, and had spent time in Japan as chief of staff to
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the Chinese revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen.17

His book,

entitled The Valor of Ignorance, predicted with stunning
(and prophetic) detail a future war between the United
States and Japan in which the latter would attack Hawaii and
easily wrest the Philippines from American control:

In these (Hawaiian) islands at the present time the
number of Japanese who have completed their active
term of service in the imperial armies, a part of
whom are veterans of the Russian War, exceeds the
entire field army of the United States. Within
twenty-four hours after a declaration of war, the
solitary American battalion that stands guard over
these islands will disappear...In a military sense,
the Philippines are closer to Japan than were the
shores of Manchuria in the Russian War...Only a
solitary division of troops must be overcome on these
undefended islands. The conquest of (the Philippines)
by Japan will be less of a military undertaking than
was the seizure of Cuba by the United States (in
1898) .18

According to Lea, the Japanese juggernaut would then easily
occupy much of the Pacific coast of the mainland United
States. Pointing out that the bulk of America's armed forces
were concentrated in the eastern part of the country, he
asserted that "in a military sense Japan is one-third closer
to (the states of) Washington, Oregon, and California than
the military power of the United States."19
The reforms which the American armed forces undertook
in the decades subsequent to the Russo-Japanese War proved
inadequate to meet the threat which Roosevelt, Root, and Lea
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(among others) discerned. Many Americans who read The Valor
of Ignorance prior to 1941 dismissed it as the work of an
eccentric "prophet of American doom."20

The United States

Army was particularly resistant to change. In his annual
message to Congress on December 6, 1904, Roosevelt reminded
the legislators that "no other civilized nation has,
relative to its population, such a diminutive army as ours,"
and emphasized the need for improving professionalism among
American soldiers.21

Continuing abhorrence of large

standing armies and an equally ingrained sense of immunity
from overseas events, however, deterred most Americans from
supporting major enlargements of the land forces of the
United States.22
Perhaps because it was the primary agent of American
military power in the Pacific Ocean, the United States Navy
proved more responsive to the potential threat which Japan
posed after 1905. In his 1904 annual message to Congress,
Roosevelt urged naval expansion in dramatic terms? "There is
no more patriotic duty before us as a people than to keep
the navy adequate to the needs of this country's position...
We have undertaken to secure for ourselves our just share in
the trade of the Orient...Unless our attitude in (this) and
all similar matters is to be a mere boastful sham, we cannot
afford to abandon our naval programme."23

Spurred by the

Japanese victory at Tsushima the following May, Congress
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allocated over $117,500,000 for the construction of warships
for the fiscal year of 1905; this grant to the navy was
nearly double that of the previous year.24

Subsequently, in

the spring of 1908, Congress authorized a policy of
constructing two battleships per year.25

The United States

thus became a full participant in the international race for
naval supremacy, which escalated rapidly as the First World
War approached.
Japan's naval primacy in the western Pacific after the
destruction of the Baltic Fleet also induced American naval
strategists to contemplate the possibility of an eventual
war between Japan and the United States. Such a threat soon
apparently emerged. In October of 1906, the school board in
San Francisco, California, enacted a segregationist law
which shunted all Chinese and Japanese students to an
"Oriental Public School."26

Understandably, this ruling

ignited considerable resentment in Japan. In the United
States, rumors of Japanese military retaliation abounded for
several tense months. At Roosevelt's urging, the General
Board of the United States Navy developed a strategic plan
for defending American insular possessions against a
Japanese onslaught. Later termed "Plan Orange," it was the
first plan in American military history that was developed
in peacetime for the conduct of war against a designated
enemy.27

In its original form, it conceded victory to Japan
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in the opening stages of the conflict. Meanwhile, however,
American warships from the Atlantic and the western Pacific
would assemble at Hawaii, and eventually launch a massive
counteroffensive. Although "Plan Orange" underwent numerous
revisions through subsequent years, it remained the basic
contingency plan of the United States Navy for war with
Japan until the eve of American entry into the Second World
War.28
The United States sought to display to the rest of the
world the results of these efforts to strengthen the
American navy in 1907. In December of that year, the "Great
White Fleet" embarked upon a global voyage; one of the most
important stops on its itinerary was Tokyo Bay. Given the
tensions between Japan and the United States at the time,
many American military and diplomatic personnel feared the
possibility of a Japanese assault upon the sixteen new
warships. As a precautionary measure, Roosevelt consulted
Tokyo, which assured him that the whole fleet would receive
a cordial welcome there. Also, the President replaced the
fleet's commander, Captain Robley Evans, universally known
as "Fighting Bob," with Admiral Charles Sperry, whose
continued advocacy of Japanese-American cooperation had
weathered the storm of anti-Japanese sentiment among the
upper echelons of the American navy. Though Sperry later
recalled that he "had been walking on eggs"29

when the

147
fleet steamed into Tokyo Bay in late October of 1908, the
visit to Japan passed without incident. According to the
historian Richard D. Challener, the Great White Fleet's
voyage to Japan, with the pro-Japanese Sperry at its helm,
"proved to be an adroit combination of the olive branch and
the sword."30

It apparently achieved the President's dual

goals of persuading Japan of the ability of the United
States to defend its interests in the Pacific and East Asia,
and of reaffirming Japanese-American harmony.
However, continued crises in Japanese-American
relations underscored American weakness in the Pacific. In
March of 1907, Roosevelt defused the tensions with Japan
arising from

San Francisco's racism by negotiating a

"Gentleman's Agreement," in which Japan agreed to limit
emigration to the United States in return for a revocation
of the offensive law. Unfortunately, the restored calm was
shattered two months later when anti-Japanese riots erupted
in the California city.31

The President, by then fully

aware of Japan's need to recover from its war with Russia,
doubted that Tokyo would interpret San Francisco's
xenophobia as a casus belli.32

Many Japanese statesmen

likewise denied the possibility of war between Japan and the
United States at that time. Count Hayashi Tadasu, Japan's
ambassador to Britain, wrote,

"...a future war between

America and Japan is only journalistic talk...a war between
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the two countries can never take place under any
circumstances...Japan regards America as her benefactor, and
she is deeply indebted to her for much help and for many
improvements. In reality, the feelings of Japan for America
are as cordial as they were fifty years ago."33
Nevertheless, this new crisis compelled American
military leaders to retreat from their original strategy in
the Pacific, particularly with regard to their plans for the
defense of the Philippines. In December of 1907, General
Leonard Wood, then the commander of the Philippine Division
of the American army, argued that Manila Bay would be the
only region in the archipelago in which American forces
could fend off a Japanese strike until rescue by the navy.34
The following year, 1908, the American navy established its
main Pacific base east of the Philippines, at Pearl Harbor
on the Hawaiian island of Oahu.35

Meanwhile, the Great

White Fleet's visit to Tokyo Bay induced Japan to accelerate
its own naval production.36

Roosevelt, cognizant that the

American position in the western Pacific was hostage to
amicable relations between the United States and Japan,
condemned the "infernal fools in California" and asserted
that, should such "reckless insults" provoke war with Japan,
"it will be the (American) Nation which will pay the
consequences."37

The Philippine archipelago, once perceived

as a vital stepping stone between the United States and
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China, had become, in Roosevelt's words, "America's heel of
Achilles" in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War.38
The Russo-Japanese War and the Portsmouth Conference
thus inaugurated an era of competition between the United
States and Japan for influence in East Asia that would
intensify through the next four decades. After 1905,
American leaders regarded Japan as the primary threat to
their Asian objectives. Conversely, lingering suspicions of
American collusion with Russia during the Portsmouth
Conference, coupled with the postwar attempts of the United
States to enhance its position on the Asian mainland,
convinced many Japanese that their erstwhile friend sought
to thwart Japan's quest for "great power" status in the
world arena. Contrary to the initial expectations of the
leaders in Tokyo and Washington, then, the tumultuous events
of 1904-1905 set their respective nations on a collision
course that would culminate in armed struggle.
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